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Summary 
International law related to patents, on the one side, and human rights, on 
the other, both constitute interesting areas of law on their own. From time-to 
time the two distinct fields of international law intertwine. A tragic but 
highly relevant example is the ongoing HIV/AIDS epidemic. The core of 
law-related considerations of the HIV/AIDS epidemic consists of specific 
parts of the two fields, namely, pharmaceutical patents and access to 
medicines, as a part of the right to health. This thesis examines this specific 
relationship between the two areas of international law. 
 Although pharmaceutical patents are mainly related to economic 
justifications and access to medicines to social justifications, both form 
justified and desirable parts of international law. As a result, the idea has 
been presented that the relationship between these two fields amounts to a 
conflict of norms. Some contributors to the debate on the relationship tend 
to get stuck on a conflict-focused approach. This thesis attempts to consider 
the relationship from a flexibility approach. Fundamental to such an 
approach are the built-in flexibilities of the present international system for 
patent protection. One such flexibility is examined in detail, namely, 
compulsory licences. 
 Although the practice of compulsory licences has been rather limited 
up until now, it is suggested that it is a flexibility with great potential for 
easing the relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to 
medicines. The use exercised so far suggests that developing countries 
taking an interest in it can be divided into an A-team and a B-team. A-team 
States are those who have domestic manufacturing capacity and B-team 
States those who have insufficient or no capacity. A-team States so far 
appear to be far better off as they can use the threat of compulsory licences 
when negotiating prices for patented medicines to get significant price 
reductions. In any case, several roadblocks appear to stand in the way of 
both A-team and B-team States trying to make use of the flexibility at 
present. These come in the form of both internal barriers such as lacking 
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‘health and intellectual property infrastructure’ and external barriers such as 
trade and diplomatic pressure from States with a strong interest in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 In conclusion, it is argued that the flexibility approach needs to be 
combined with an understanding of the necessity of political commitment. 
In other words, States need to start taking their international obligations 
seriously. This holds true both for obligations following from the patent 
framework, including the full realization of flexibilities such as compulsory 
licences, and the human rights framework, including access to medicines. A 
three-step agenda is presented as a suggestion on the direction that future 
development on the relationship should be heading. First, the importance of 
both patents and the related international instruments, on the one side, and 
access to medicines and its instruments, on the other, must be fully 
recognised by its Member States. Secondly, there is a need to promote and 
create awareness about the flexibilities to the TRIPS Agreement in general 
and compulsory licences in particular. Thirdly, international cooperation and 
assistance must be exercised on a much wider scale than what is seen today. 
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1 Introduction 
Patents are often seen as a necessary component in the domestic legislations 
of modern States with the potential to assist in the quest for the progress of 
society. The general idea of such a view is that the incentive offered by 
patent protection is invaluable to invention. With the adoption of the 1994 
Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS 
Agreement), an increasing scope of patentability has been codified. Patents 
now stretch broadly across all fields of technology, particularly into the 
pharmaceutical sector, for every State that wants to be a Member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Under the requirements of the TRIPS 
Agreement national authorities must provide patent protection for a 
minimum period of 20 years if the invention meets adequate patentability 
standards. 
 At the same time, patent protection does not occur in a vacuum. The 
granting of a patent and the monopoly privilege that results from it takes 
place in a societal context. Patents and the international legal framework 
related to their administration are just one of the colours on the much bigger 
palette that constitutes international law. Another colour on the same palette 
is provided by the human rights framework. Human rights, such as the right 
to health, are generally accepted as an integral part for the advancement of 
society and human well-being. Access to medicines, in one form or the 
other, is usually considered to constitute a fundamental part of the right to 
health. Unfortunately, for millions of people around the world, access to 
medicines is nothing but a ´golden dream. Reports on the overall access to 
essential medicines in some developing countries are often very disturbing 
to read. 
 It is not very difficult to think of situations where the two areas of 
international law, i.e. pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines, could 
possibly intertwine. A tragic example that has received a lot of attention in 
recent years is the worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic. The monopoly 
privileges of patent protection allow pharmaceutical companies to put a 
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price on medicines, e.g. HIV/AIDS medicines, which can sometimes be 
beyond the reach of poor developing countries. It is precisely such situations 
that have seen the link between pharmaceutical patents and access to 
medicines turn into a hotly debated topic on the international arena. Some 
human rights advocates claim that the present international system of patent 
protection is hindering the right to health, including its cornerstone of access 
to medicines. In other words, they believe that there is a legal conflict at 
hand between the two separate areas of international law. Others, usually 
representatives of the pharmaceutical industry and States with a strong 
interest in the pharmaceutical industry, prefer to focus on patents as a 
fundamental incentive for inventions. They usually argue that the right to 
health is a beneficiary of patents as their existence in the long run 
guarantees newer and more efficient medicines. 
 Clearly, the two distinct areas of international law intertwine 
occasionally, and these meetings do not always run smoothly. However, it is 
necessary that these vital parts of international law function well together. 
For that to happen, it is essential to find a proper balance, where both sides 
will give each other due consideration. This balance will have to consider 
the economic motives usually linked to patents and the social motives 
usually linked to human rights and find a way of making it work. An 
approach that constantly points out situations where there may, or may not, 
be a legal conflict at hand does not appear to be the most constructive way 
forward. Therefore, the contribution of the built-in flexibilities to patent 
protection offered in the TRIPS Agreement are worthy of examination. The 
flexibilities, most notably compulsory licences, have great potential to work 
as a balancing tool in the relationship between pharmaceutical patents and 
access to medicines. Consequently, the role played by compulsory licences 
in the relationship up until now, including potential issues standing in the 
way of utilisation, appears to be both interesting and highly relevant. 
Compulsory licences could possibly be the tool required to blend two 
colours on the palette of international law, i.e. pharmaceutical patents and 
access to medicines, into the colour needed to fulfil the painting of societal 
progress and the highest attainable standard of health for everyone. 
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1.1 Purpose and Delimitation 
The idea for the topic of this thesis comes from a paper written during a 
course in industrial property rights as part of the Master’s Programme in 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights Law at the Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute in Lund, Sweden. The title of the paper was ‘Patents, 
the Right to Health, and the Problems Faced by Compulsory Licences’. 
Thanks to writing the paper, my interest in the relationship between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines developed quite a bit. 
However, as a paper has its limitations in space, it was felt that the topic 
could be developed a lot more. A lot of stones were left unturned, and it is 
the purpose of this thesis to make sure that also those stones are turned. 
 The overall purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship 
between patents and the right to health in international law. More 
specifically, certain parts of these distinct but interrelated areas of 
international law will be targeted, namely, pharmaceutical patents and 
access to medicines. To allow for a thorough understanding of the topic, it is 
necessary to include a rather large section on the international legal 
framework related to these two areas of international law. As these two 
areas of law are rarely explained next to each other, the aim of this thesis is 
to do just that and, thus, provide the reader with a useful tool for coming to 
grips with precisely what areas of international law are at stake. 
Furthermore, it is the aim of this thesis to contribute to the highly debated 
topic of the potential influence of pharmaceutical patents on access to 
medicines. It will do so by examining and pinpointing the main problem 
areas in this relationship. A necessary part of such an examination is to 
consider different options in approaching the relationship and examining 
current trends in both the scholarly and the institutional world. 
 Finally, the purpose of this thesis is also to highlight one particular 
flexibility in the present international patent system, namely, compulsory 
licences. The idea is to cover various aspects of this flexibility, such as its 
base in international law, its role as a tool for bridging potential gaps in the 
relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines, 
practice exercised on compulsory licences up until now and potential 
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roadblocks standing in the way of its use. In other words, the aim is to 
present the reader with an illustrative view of the role played by compulsory 
licences in international law today. Therefore, the following questions will 
be used as a foundation for this thesis: 
 
•  What are the main features of the relationship between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines in international law, 
including the legal and institutional characteristics of the two distinct 
areas of international law?  
•  Is there any evident legal conflict between the two distinct areas of 
international law, or is it possible to approach the relationship in a 
different manner? 
•  How do the flexibilities of the present patent regime, especially 
compulsory licences, fit into the equation? Can the system of 
compulsory licences assist in bridging potential negative effects that 
pharmaceutical patents may have on access to medicines? What does 
the practice of compulsory licences up until now reveal – widespread 
use or limited use? If use has been limited, is it possible to deduce 
potential roadblocks standing in the way of more widespread use? 
 
Access to medicines can probably be approached as a component of several 
internationally recognised human rights, such as the rights to health, life, 
and enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress. For limitations of space 
and for presenting a more in-depth study of a specific human right, this 
thesis will be limited to consider access to medicines as a part of the right to 
health. Other human rights, such as those mentioned, will only be briefly 
touched upon. It is hoped that this delimitation will present the reader with 
useful information on how a specific human right functions with a specific 
part of the present international patent system. 
 There are various flexibilities to patents under the present international 
legal framework, such as differential pricing, parallel importing, and 
compulsory licences. This thesis will be limited to the latter of these. Other 
flexibilities will only briefly be mentioned to make the reader aware of the 
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variety. Partly this is due to limitations of space, but mostly because the aim 
of this thesis is to present an in-depth study of a particular topic. The regime 
of compulsory licences has been highly debated in recent years by everyone 
from international organizations with an interest in the topic, such as the UN 
and the WTO, to scholars. Therefore, it is believed that compulsory licences 
for pharmaceutical patents represent both an interesting and relevant focal 
point and, thus, a well-suited delimitation to make in this thesis. 
1.2 Method and Terminology 
In order to fulfil the aim of providing the reader with a useful tool to assist 
in the understanding of two intertwining areas of international law, i.e. 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines, large parts of the thesis 
consists of descriptive parts on existing international law on the topic. 
However, analytical parts are included throughout to present a more 
interesting text on the topic chosen. As it is not the aim of this thesis to give 
any recommendations on what future law in the field could or should look 
like, i.e. de lege ferenda, the perspective applied is exclusively that of de 
lege lata. 
 Though it is hoped that the language used in this thesis will appear 
clear and consistent to the reader, one particular issue could possibly seem 
inconsistent and should therefore be clarified. When discussing a national 
entity in the text, such as South Africa or the United States, the terms 
country/countries and State/States will be used interchangeably. The main 
reason for this is that much discussion is devoted to developing countries. 
Developing countries is a widely accepted term and the United Nations 
normally use the term interchangeably with States in their documents. 
Therefore, it is believed that a similar approach is well-suited for this thesis. 
1.3 Material 
A vast amount of material has been used to produce this thesis. Primary 
sources in the form of international instruments have formed a natural part 
of this thesis when presenting the international legal framework. However, 
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the materials most useful, and also most frequently used, to describe the 
topic chosen have been subsidiary sources. For instance judicial decisions, 
including dispute settlement procedures within the WTO and national cases, 
and various forms of legal academic works have been central to the 
completion of this thesis. Concerning the legal academic works, much of the 
material related to patent protection does not concern itself with the 
relationship to human rights. Similarly, a lot of the material describing the 
particular human right under scrutiny in this thesis, i.e. the right to health, 
does not reflect upon the relationship to patents. This can of course at times 
be frustrating when trying to bring the two together for scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, a fair amount of contributors have taken the step to contrast 
the two areas of international law. A trend within the material discussing the 
relationship and the potential effects of pharmaceutical patents on access to 
medicines is to limit the discussion to access to HIV/AIDS medicines. As a 
result of this, a lot of the discussion in this thesis will also be on access to 
such medicines. 
 A few contributors have proved invaluable for the completion of this 
thesis, either because of inspiration or due to the fact that they have been 
used extensively. One such contributor is Philippe Cullet and his article 
‘Patents and Medicines: the Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Human Right to Health’. This article has been both inspiring in that 
it approaches the topic in an interesting way and very helpful, as evident 
from the fact that it has been used extensively as a reference throughout this 
thesis. Additionally, the multiple articles by Frederick M. Abbott on the 
relationship have been of great assistance in that they clarify complicated 
aspects in a helpful way. Among other things, his extensive clarifications of 
the Decision on Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and public health have proved very useful for the 
understanding of the full scope of that document. One author should also be 
mentioned for his extensive and very useful book on the TRIPS Agreement 
and the negotiations taking place before and after its adoption. Daniel 
Gervais’ book ‘The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis’ has 
proved to be a fundamental component for the completion of the chapter on 
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the international legal framework related to patents. Finally, Cecilia Oh’s 
article ‘Compulsory Licences: Recent Experiences in Developing Countries’ 
has offered necessary guidance on the practice of compulsory licences for 
pharmaceutical patents in recent years. Seeing as such material is very 
difficult to find, the information provided by this article has been very 
welcome for the broadening of this thesis. 
1.4 Outline 
Following this introductory chapter is the second chapter which contains a 
presentation of the international legal framework related to the right to 
health as a part of the larger human rights framework. In this chapter, it is 
established that access to medicines constitutes a fundamental part of the 
right to health. This chapter also includes a presentation of the international 
legal framework related to patents. The development of patent protection in 
international law, with the 1994 TRIPS Agreement as a cornerstone, is 
presented. Succeeding instruments and their focus on compulsory licences 
and the potential effects of pharmaceutical patents are also brought to the 
attention of the reader. 
 The third chapter is devoted to the relationship between pharmaceutical 
patents and access to medicines. This chapter takes off by briefly discussing 
the idea that patents themselves could amount to a human right. After that, 
the alarming HIV/AIDS epidemic is used as an illustrative example of a 
situation where pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines intertwine. 
Having established that the two areas of international law sometimes do 
intertwine, the next step is to consider if the relationship amounts to a legal 
conflict. Therefore, section 3.3 examines the relationship to consider 
whether it amounts to a legal conflict or if there is room to focus on 
available flexibilities. For clarification, a brief description of the flexibilities 
available under the international patent framework is provided. Following 
that is a part looking into the practice of one of the flexibilities, compulsory 
licences, in more detail. As it is discovered that there has only been limited 
use of compulsory licences up until now, the next part of the chapter 
suggests a few possible roadblocks standing in the way of greater use. To 
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conclude the chapter, a final part presenting some reflections on the 
relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines in 
general and compulsory licences in particular is provided. 
 The fourth chapter concludes the thesis by presenting some analytical 
observations on the results arrived upon during the course of examination. 
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2 International Legal 
Framework 
When examining the relationship between pharmaceutical patents and 
access to medicines, a fundamental first step is to examine the international 
legal framework they are placed in. To get the full picture of the two 
concepts, one should keep in mind that they are part of two wider sets of 
rules, namely, human rights and intellectual property rights. Therefore, this 
chapter aims to present a general picture of the right to health, and its 
respective cornerstone of access to medicines, and pharmaceutical patents 
and the wider frameworks they are connected to. The two concepts and their 
corresponding regulations will be presented separately in the following. 
However, the perceptive reader will also find that some parts of the legal 
framework presented are concerned with the relationship between the two. 
2.1 Human Rights 
2.1.1 Historical Background 
The atrocities of World War II provided for the immediate background and 
spark for the adoption of what has been called “the single most authoritative 
statement of human rights”1, namely, the 1948 Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights2 (UDHR). 
 However, the 20th century was not the first time in history that the idea 
surfaced that every human being should be bestowed with a number of 
rights because of her existence as an individual. At least in Western history 
the roots of the UDHR can be traced back well into antiquity, and maybe 
more prominently to latter parts of history with such instruments as the 
English Bill of Rights in 1689 and the American Declaration of 
                                                 
1 A. R. Chapman, ‘The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection’, 
5(4) Journal of International Economic Law (2002) p. 862 [hereinafter Chapman 2002]. 
2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, GA Res 217A 
(III), 3 UN GAOR Resolutions, part 1, p. 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). 
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Independence in 1776.3 Nevertheless, the pre-war international system 
focused exclusively on State-State relations. Potential human rights 
violations that took place within the borders of a State were generally 
considered an ‘internal affair’. The human rights movement epitomised by 
the UDHR altered the scope of international law by piercing the veil of 
national sovereignty and elevating human rights as an issue of international 
concern.4
 A comprehensive list of human rights granted to every human being is 
enumerated in the UDHR. The opening 21 Articles presents a series of civil 
and political rights, including, among many other, the rights to life, liberty 
and security of person; equality before the law and non-discrimination; and 
freedom of thought conscience and religion. Additionally, a number of 
economic, social and cultural rights are included in the enumeration. These 
include the rights to favourable conditions of work; to education; to a 
standard of living adequate for health and well-being; and to share in the 
benefits of scientific advancement. 
 As a Declaration concluded by the UN General Assembly, the UDHR 
is not a legally enforceable instrument as such. However, the provisions 
contained in the UDHR, or at least some of them, have subsequently 
assumed the status of customary international law.5 Therefore, the UDHR 
constitutes an authoritative source and a highly relevant instrument. 
Nevertheless, to turn the provisions of the UDHR into legally binding 
human rights obligations, the UN continued its work on the human rights 
framework by drafting a series of human rights instruments. These 
instruments developed and clarified the rights enumerated in the UDHR. 
Two central instruments are the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
                                                 
3 G. Alfredsson and A. Eide, ‘Introduction’ in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds.), The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – A Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1999) pp. xxv-xxviii. 
4 L. O. Gostin and Z. Lazzarini, Human Rights and Public Health in the AIDS Pandemic 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 2 [hereinafter Gostin and Lazzarini]. 
5 See, e.g., A. R. Chapman ‘A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, 
Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science’ in Intellectual Property and 
Human Rights (WIPO Publication No. 762(E), 1999) p. 132; M. N. Shaw, International 
Law, Fifth Edition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) pp. 256-261 
[hereinafter Shaw]. 
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Political Rights6 (ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights7 (ICESCR). Combined with the 
UDHR, they are usually referred to as the International Bill of Human 
Rights. States ratifying the ICCPR and ICESCR and other human rights 
instruments8 become legally bound by their requirements as States Parties. 
Nearly all UN Member States have ratified some of the human rights 
instruments, and a number of instruments have been ratified by an 
overwhelming majority of Member States.9 The instrument most relevant to 
the following discussion, the ICESCR, has some 157 States Parties.10
 There is widespread acceptance that the legal obligations assumed by a 
State as a result of becoming a Party to a human rights instrument are 
threefold. First, they must respect the right by abstaining from taking legal 
or policy measures that would violate it. Secondly, they must take measures 
to protect the right from being violated by third parties. Finally, to fulfil the 
right, States Parties must implement positive measures that assist 
individuals to enjoy their right.11 Seeing as human rights instruments are 
something that States and not individuals become Parties to, it is the State 
that assumes legal obligations. The legal obligation for each and every 
human right should be considered under this threefold approach. 
 Traditionally, it has been a common feature to equate human rights 
with civil and political rights. The development of the international human 
rights framework in the decades succeeding the adoption of the UDHR has, 
                                                 
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR, 
Supp. No. 16, p. 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966).  
7 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN 
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, p. 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
8 See infra chapter 2.1.2 for a discussion on a few of these instruments in relation to the 
right to health. 
9 Chapman 2002, supra note 1, p. 864. 
10 As of 3 December 2007, UN Treaty Database, 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty5.asp>, 
visited on 3 December 2007. 
11 The legal obligations of States have been developed by human rights monitoring bodies, 
such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), through General 
Comments (authoritative interpretations of the human rights instruments), see, e.g., General 
Comment No. 12 of the CESCR, dealing with the right to adequate food (Article 11), UN 
Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, para. 15; General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR, dealing with the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health (Article 12), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 
paras. 33-37, 50-52 [hereinafter General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR]. 
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however, emphasised the equal importance of civil and political rights on 
the one side and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. In fact, 
nowadays States have committed themselves to the equal importance and 
universality of all human rights to an extent great enough for some 
commentators to hold it as an international consensus.12 An illustrative and 
highly relevant example of this is the language used in the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights, “All human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent”.13 Consequently, to realise any one right, all other human 
rights must be protected and promoted at the same time. 
 Although States have committed themselves to the equal importance of 
all human rights, it should be noted that the drafters of the ICESCR 
anticipated the potential problems for some States of realising immediately 
the full provisions of all the rights in the Covenant. Therefore a provision on 
progressive realization was included in Article 2(1). It states that each State 
Party “undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights”. This is different from the ICCPR, which in 
Article 2(2) obliges each State Party to take legislative or other measures as 
may be necessary to give effect to the rights included in the Covenant. In 
other words, necessary measures must be taken to give immediate effect to 
the rights. However, it should be noted that the monitoring body for the 
ICESCR, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), has interpreted the provisions of the ICESCR to mandate all 
States Parties to move quickly and effectively towards full realization of the 
rights. In other words, progressive realization does not remove obligations 
on the States Parties. Additionally, the CESCR has also clarified that the 
ICESCR entails some obligations which should have immediate effect, 
including core or key obligations related to each specific right enumerated 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Chapman 2002, supra note 1, p. 863. 
13 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 5. 
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in the Covenant.14 Core obligations will be returned to when discussing the 
right to health, including access to medicines, in more detail later. 
 Conclusively, the development of human rights during the 20th century 
was not a completely novel idea since thoughts on rights of individuals had 
surfaced prior to that. However, it cemented and developed the idea that 
every individual is entitled to a number of human rights and, importantly, 
created an international legal framework on human rights. In other words, to 
recognise these rights under international law was novel, as was holding 
States accountable for violations.15 Justification for this framework can be 
found both in the fact that the ideas had surfaced for quite some time and 
that the importance of human rights was and continues to be an integral part 
of the UN system.16 Seeing as almost every State in the world is a member 
of the UN17, and a great number of States are Parties to one or more of the 
international human rights instruments, human rights are evidently an 
important part of international law. We will now proceed by looking into 
one particular human right, the right to health, in more detail. 
2.1.2 The Development of a Right to Health 
The concept of a right to health has, much like the general human rights 
framework, been developed in recent parts of history. This is not to say that 
a sense of State or community responsibility for the health of the public did 
not exist in the past. In fact, there are indications that the authorities even in 
ancient civilisations took measures to improve the health of the public.18 
However, such measures usually reflected a desire to promote the public 
good rather than concerns for individual welfare or greater access to health 
                                                 
14 See General Comment No. 3 of the CESCR, dealing with the nature of States parties 
obligations (Article 2(1)), UN Doc. E/1991/23, Annex III, pp. 83-87 [hereinafter General 
Comment No. 3 of the CESCR]; see also Chapman 2002, supra note 1, pp. 864-866. 
15 Gostin and Lazzarini, supra note 4, p. 2. 
16 Shaw, supra note 5, p. 261. 
17 191 States Parties as of 3 December 2007, UN Treaty Database, 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterI/treaty1.asp>, 
visited on 3 December 2007. 
18 See B. C. A. Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law 
(Intersentia, Antwerp, 1999) pp. 7-16 [hereinafter Toebes 1999], presenting a useful 
summary of the historical evolution of health as a human right. 
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care. References to a right to health in official documents were on the whole 
absent before the 20th century.19
 The first organization to explicitly formulate a ‘right to health’ was the 
World Health Organization (WHO).20 In the Preamble of its Constitution 
from 1946, it is stated that “The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being”.21 
Furthermore, health is defined as “a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.22 It 
has been noted that the WHO approach is a problematic grounding for a 
human right as it implies that a Government must guarantee complete 
physical, mental and social well-being for all its citizens. Such an approach 
is not really feasible as “a right to health cannot be meaningfully interpreted 
as a right to be healthy”.23 Seeing as the health status is not only the result 
of State obligations, but also actions of other individuals and the behaviour 
of the individual herself, it is difficult not to agree with this view. 
 Drafters of the human rights framework appear to have been a bit more 
cautious in their approach. The foundations for an international legal 
framework on a right to health were laid by the UDHR, adopted two years 
after the WHO Constitution.24 Somewhat influenced by the WHO 
Constitution, but staying clear from a narrow definition, Article 25(1) 
enumerates “the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services”. Since then, the right to 
                                                 
19 Ibid.; A. R. Chapman, ‘Core Obligations Related to the Right to Health’ in A. R. 
Chapman and S. Russell (eds.), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003) pp. 190-191 [hereinafter Chapman 
2003]. 
20 B. C. A. Toebes, ‘The Right to Health’ in A. Eide et al (eds.), Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: a Textbook, Second Revised Edition (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 2001) 
p. 172 [hereinafter Toebes 2001]. 
21 Constitution of the World Health Organization, adopted by the International Health 
Conference held in New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946, 14 UNTS 185, 193 States 
Parties as of 3 December 2007, UN Treaty Database, 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIX/treaty1.asp>, 
visited on 3 December 2007. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Chapman 2003, supra note 19, pp. 187-188. 
24 See Toebes 1999, supra note 18, pp. 27-88, for an extensive examination of the right to 
health in international instruments and related draft work. 
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health has been codified in numerous legally binding international and 
regional human rights instruments. 
 The ICESCR provides what has been called the “cornerstone 
protection”25 and “the most authoritative delineation”26 of the right to health 
in international law. In its Article 12(1), it defines the right as “the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health”. The ‘highest attainable standard of health’ had already been 
pinpointed as a fundamental right by the WHO Constitution 20 years earlier. 
However, with the ICESCR it was established in a legally binding 
instrument and, importantly, not combined with the unfeasible definition of 
its predecessor. In the second paragraph of the Article, a non-exhaustive list 
of States Parties’ obligations under the right to health is included: 
 
“(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and 
for the healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.”27
 
Additional right to health protection for certain vulnerable groups can be 
found in group-specific instruments. For example, the 1989 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child28 includes Article 24 which is fully focused on the 
child’s right to health, and adopts a similar definitional approach as that of 
the ICESCR. Emphasising non-discrimination in relation to the right to 
health, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
                                                 
25 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health (Paul Hunt), 13 February 2003,UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/58, para. 11 [hereinafter Special Rapporteur 2003]. 
26 Chapman 2003, supra note 19, p. 191. 
27 Article 12(2) of the ICESCR, see supra note 7 
28 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 November 1989, 1553 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 2 September 1990), GA Res. 25 (XLIV), 44 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 49, 
p. 166, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989). 
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of Racial Discrimination29, in Article 5(e)(iv), and the 1979 Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women30, in Article 
12, proscribe race-based and gender-based discrimination in health 
services.31 Furthermore, the right to health has a clear link to other rights 
enumerated in the ICESCR, such as food, clothing and housing, listed in 
Article 11. Not least, this is evident from the fact that the UDHR in Article 
25 enumerates these rights in the same Article as the right to health. One 
author, Brigit Toebes, explains these rights as “underlying preconditions for 
health”. As such, Toebes claims that they are both fundamental for realizing 
a right to health and at them same time a natural part of the specific right to 
health.32 In addition, the inherent right to life in Article 6 of the ICCPR 
could also be advocated as closely related to the right to health. In fact, the 
monitoring body for the ICCPR has explained that the role of the State in 
protecting the right to life includes measures to eliminate epidemics.33
 In addition to international standards, the right to health has also found 
its way into several regional human rights instruments. These include the 
1961 European Social Charter34 (Article 11); the 1981 African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights35 (Article 16); the 1988 Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights36 (Article 10); and the 1990 African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child37 (Article 14). 
                                                 
29 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopted 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969), GA Res. 
2106 (XX), 20 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 20, p. 47, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965). 
30 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted 
18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981), GA Res. 
34/180, 34 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 46, p. 193, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1980). 
31 A. E. Yamin, ‘Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right under International 
Law’, 21 Boston University International Law Journal (2003), p. 338 [hereinafter Yamin]. 
32 Toebes 2001, supra note 20, pp. 174-175. 
33 General Comment No. 6 of the Human Rights Committee, dealing with the right to life 
(Article 6), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, p. 34. 
34 European Social Charter, adopted 18 October 1961, ETS No. 35; revised in 1996, ETS 
No. 163 (the revision did not bring any significant changes to the listed right to health). 
35 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
36 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 17 November 1988, OAS Treaty Series, No. 
69. 
37 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, adopted July 1990, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
 20
 Furthermore, the right to health, or health-related rights, is also 
included in a number of national constitutions. According to the preliminary 
findings of a study on the topic, more than 60 constitutional provisions 
include the right to health, or the right to health care, and more than 40 
constitutional provisions include health-related rights, such as a right to 
reproductive health care.38 A combination of both can be found in the South 
African Constitution, stating that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to 
health care services, including reproductive health care”.39
 Apparently, there is widespread recognition of the right to health in 
international, regional and national instruments. However, without some 
form of accountability, the right runs the risk of becoming merely 
aspirational. Fortunately, the right to health has the evidence to prove that it 
is connected to judicial accountability. Numerous cases have been brought 
and tried by international, regional and national tribunals.40 The practice of 
these tribunals can help in clarifying the meaning of the right to health and 
hopefully work to secure better health services for those in need. To name 
but one case, in the Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, the 
South African Constitutional Court held that the Government was not doing 
all it reasonably could in providing for health services to pregnant women in 
risk of infecting their children with HIV.41
 Before moving on to identify the core content and corresponding 
obligations on States, it should be noted that there has been much confusion 
over what the most suitable term for the right is. Several terms have 
occurred in law literature. However, ‘the right to health’, ‘the right to health 
care’ and ‘the right to health protection’ are probably the most common 
                                                 
38 Special Rapporteur 2003, supra note 25, para. 20. 
39 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter 2, para. 27(1)(a), 
<http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm>, visited on 3 
December 2007. 
40 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (Paul Hunt), 17 January 2007,UN 
Doc. A/HRC/4/28, paras. 55-89, for a useful summary of cases. 
41 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 5 July 2002, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, CCT 8/02, <http://www.law-
lib.utoronto.ca/Diana/TAC_case_study/MinisterofhealthvTACconst.court.pdf>, visited on 3 
December 2007; see also M. Heywood, ‘Shaping, Making and Breaking the Law in the 
Campaign for a National HIV/AIDS Treatment Plan’ in P. Jones and K. Stokke (eds.), 
Democratising Development: the Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2005) pp. 181-212. 
 21
ones. Though the various terms have their respective advocates, it is 
believed that the ‘right to health’ is the most suitable one, both in general 
and for the purpose of this thesis. Brigit Toebes has presented a convincing 
argument for applying the term ‘the right to health’. Her approach is three-
fold in justification. First, it is the term best in line with the character of 
provisions in international human rights instruments. Secondly, it is the term 
most commonly used at the international level when discussing health 
issues. Finally, it allows for recognising a number of underlying 
preconditions for health within the specific right, such as access to safe 
drinking water and environmental health.42
 With more than half a century of legal progression in a variety of 
international, regional and national instruments, the confusion over what 
term to use coincides with confusion and controversy about the specific 
content of the right to health and the corresponding obligations of States 
Parties. Fortunately, the CESCR and several scholars have pronounced 
themselves on precisely this, and can surely be used as an indication of what 
the right entails. Alicia E. Yamin has even argued that the right to health 
“has undergone remarkable normative development and clarification in 
recent years”.43
 Rather than trying to point out every possible component of the content 
of the right, it could be useful to focus on the core content of the right. As 
the provision on the right to health in the ICESCR is normally considered to 
be the cornerstone provision, it is only natural for it to form the basis of an 
examination of the core content. First, it is necessary to keep in mind that 
the rights enumerated in the ICESCR are normally to be realized under the 
standard of progressive realization.44 Without any restriction on progressive 
realization, it could potentially leave an escape clause wide enough to render 
large parts of the ICESCR practically nullified. To prevent this, a number of 
                                                 
42 Toebes 1999, supra note 18, pp. 16-20. 
43 Yamin, supra note 31, p. 336. 
44 See supra chapter 2.1.1. 
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restrictions have been imposed on the standard, both in the language of the 
ICESCR itself and by interpretations of it.45
 Firstly, the language of the ICESCR in Articles 2(2) and 3 clearly 
indicates that States Parties have an immediate obligation to guarantee that 
the rights in the Covenant are not exercised discriminatorily. In other words, 
the obligation to ensure non-discrimination is not subject to progressive 
realization. This has been confirmed by the CESCR on a number of times46, 
and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health has reiterated this 
view47. 
 Secondly, when it comes to interpretations of the ICESCR, there has 
been a trend since the 1980s among scholars and relevant UN institutions 
towards establishing the core of the right to health.48 Brigit Toebes 
describes this so-called core content49 as “a set of elements States must 
guarantee under any circumstances, irrespective of their available 
resources”.50 The concept of core content for economic, social and cultural 
rights in general, and for the right to health in particular has been given a lot 
of attention by the CESCR. In its General Comment No. 3, the Committee 
declared that the concept of core content was to ensure the satisfaction of, at 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights in the ICESCR in every 
State Party. Without such a concept, the ICESCR would be largely deprived 
of its raison d'être.51 In its General Comment No. 14, it clarified the concept 
in relation to the right to health. Inspired by the 1978 WHO Alma-Ata 
                                                 
45 A. R. Chapman and S. Russell, ‘Introduction’ ‘Core Obligations Related to the Right to 
Health’ in A. R. Chapman and S. Russell (eds.), Core Obligations: Building a Framework 
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003) pp. 4-5. 
46 See, e.g., General Comment No. 3 of the CESCR, supra note 14, para. 1; General 
Comment No. 16 of the CESCR, dealing with the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (Article 3), UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4, 
paras. 16-17. 
47 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur 2003, supra note 25, para. 27; Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health (Paul Hunt), Mission to the World Trade Organization, 1 March 
2004, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1, paras. 21-22 [hereinafter Special Rapporteur 2004]. 
48 Toebes 2001, supra note 20, pp. 175-177. 
49 In literature and UN documents it has been variously referred to as minimum core 
content, core content, essential elements, core entitlements, core obligations, minimum 
State obligations and various other forms. The term core content is chosen for this thesis as 
it is felt it is a neutral term well-suited for shifting the focus to the actual content rather than 
the terminology. In addition, it is widely used in literature on the topic. 
50 Toebes 2001, supra note 20, p. 176. 
51 General Comment No. 3 of the CESCR, supra note 14, para. 10. 
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Declaration52, the Committee presented a, not necessarily exhaustive, list of 
elements constituting the core content. Presented in the form of duties upon 
States, the list includes, among others, the duties to: 
 
• ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on 
 a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalised 
 groups; 
• provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the 
 WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs53; 
• ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and  services; 
• adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of 
 action…; 
• provide immunisation against the major infectious diseases 
 occurring in the community; 
• take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic 
 diseases.54 
 
The Committee then went on to clarify that resource constraints “cannot, 
under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its (i.e. the State Party) non-
compliance with the core obligations…which are non-derogable”.55 The 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health adheres to the view of core content 
as something that is of immediate effect.56
 When discussing the feasibility of a core content-approach, the 
Committee touches upon something that is of utmost importance for the 
fulfilment of the rights in the ICESCR in general and the core content of 
those rights in particular. The General Comment states that “it is particularly 
incumbent on States Parties and other actors in a position to assist, to 
provide international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and 
                                                 
52 Alma-Ata Declaration, Report of the International Conference on Primary Health 
Care, Alma-Ata, 6-12 September 1978, in World Health Organization, Health for All 
Series, No. 1 (Geneva, WHO, 1978). 
53 See infra chapter 2.1.2.1 for a more detailed discussion on access to medicines as a part 
of the right to health. 
54 General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR, supra note 11, paras. 43-44. 
55 Ibid., para. 47 (my parenthesis). 
56 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur 2004, supra note 47, paras. 21-22. 
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technical”.57 International assistance and cooperation is stipulated in Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR and is of fundamental importance for States with lesser 
resources to be able to fulfil their obligations. The need for international 
assistance and cooperation has also been targeted by the Commission on 
Human Rights, the predecessor to the present Human Rights Council.58 
Evidently, international assistance and cooperation forms a fundamental part 
of the right to health. 
 The application of the concept of core content to the right to health, 
however, needs to be exercised with some caution. To single out certain 
elements that form the core content brings the risk of interpreting the 
remaining elements of the right as unimportant. In a ‘worst case scenario’, 
this could lead to States denying these important elements of the right. 
Therefore, it is necessary at all times to keep in mind there is a clear 
obligation on States to take steps towards the full enjoyment of the right.59
 Conclusively, the right to health should not be understood as right to be 
healthy, but rather a requirement on States to provide “a system of health 
protection which provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the 
highest attainable level of health”.60 As has been demonstrated, this includes 
the notion that some elements of the right should be realized immediately, 
without affecting the importance of the other elements. One element that 
should be fulfilled immediately, notwithstanding available resources, is the 
core content of the right to health. We will now proceed by examining a 
fundamental part of this core content in more detail, namely, access to 
medicines. 
2.1.2.1 Access to medicines 
A perceptive reader will quickly realize that there is no ‘right of access to 
medicines’ in existing human rights instruments. However, such an 
obligation, although not defined as a specific human right, is firmly rooted 
                                                 
57 General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR, supra note 11, para. 45. 
58 Commission on Human Rights Res. 2002/31, The right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2002/31. 
59 Toebes 2001, supra note 20, p. 176. 
60 General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR, supra note 11, para. 8. 
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in the implications of existing provisions on human rights, especially the 
right to health. All the instruments and respective provisions enumerated in 
the previous chapter form the general legal basis also when it comes to 
access to medicines. Therefore, instead of repeating the material base, this 
chapter will focus more directly on discussions within both relevant UN 
institutions and the scholarly world on the interpretation of the right to 
health as to include access to medicines. Furthermore, it will try to clarify 
what access to medicines constitutes for the purpose of its role within the 
right to health, including the resulting obligations on States. 
 Access to medicines and its role within the human rights framework 
has been a highly debated topic within both relevant UN institutions and the 
scholarly world in recent years. A strong case for access to medicines as 
being part of the right to health is presented by the CESCR. In its General 
Comment No. 14, it lists, among other elements, the need to provide 
essential medicines, to provide immunisation against major infectious 
diseases and to take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and 
endemic diseases as being part of the core content of the right to health. It 
then goes on to state that these obligations are a non-derogable part of the 
right.61 Though the Committee’s interpretations are not legally binding, they 
“may be said to have considerable legal weight”.62
 Other UN institutions and mechanisms have articulated similar views. 
First, the Commission on Human Rights has adopted numerous resolutions 
on the topic of “access to medication in the context of pandemics such as 
HIV/AIDS”. In one of the resolutions, from 2002, the Commission 
“[r]ecognizes that access to medication in the context of pandemics such as 
HIV/AIDS is one fundamental element for achieving…the right of everyone 
to…the highest attainable standard of…health”. It then goes on to call upon 
States to promote availability and accessibility on an international level.63 In 
                                                 
61 See supra chapter 2.1.2. 
62 L. Ferreira, ‘Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: the Human Rights Obligations of 
Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations’, 71 Fordham Law Review (2002), p. 1163 
[hereinafter Ferreira]. 
63 Commission on Human Rights Res. 2002/32, Access to Medication in the Context of 
Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/32 [hereinafter CHR Res. 
2002/32]. 
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addition, the Special Rapporteur on health has on a number of occasions 
pointed out that access to medicines forms an indispensable part of the right 
to health.64
 Deliberation within the UN system has run parallel to an extensive 
debate in the scholarly world. Several contributors consider access to 
medicines to be an important part of the right to health. The general view is 
that this is the result of several factors. These factors include: a well-
established human right to health open for interpretation; the development 
within relevant UN institutions to consider it to be the case; and special 
needs created by the current health status in the world. In academic works 
on the topic, access to medicines has been advocated as an “essential”65 and 
“fundamental”66 part of the right to health. Alicia E. Yamin presents a 
strong argument for access to medicines as being a necessary part of the 
right to health by looking at the text of Article 12 in the ICESCR. In her 
opinion, “[a]ccess to medications is a critical component of the right to 
health both as treatment for epidemic and endemic diseases and as part of 
medical attention in the event of any kind of sickness”.67 A majority among 
human rights scholars appear to support the idea of access to medicines as 
constituting a fundamental part of the right to health. However, not 
everyone is as optimistic about the possibility of clarifying the content of 
the right. David P. Fidler simply puts it that “the right is so broad that it 
lacks coherent meaning”.68
 To obtain a thorough understanding of what access to medicines 
consists of, it may be useful to consider some of the clarifications that have 
been brought forward within the UN system. First, in the already frequently 
mentioned General Comment No. 14, the CESCR offers an analytical 
framework to provide for a better understanding of the right to health. This 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (Paul Hunt), 13 September 
2006, UN Doc. A/61/338, paras. 40, 56 [hereinafter Special Rapporteur 2006]. 
65 N. Nanda and R. Lodha, ‘Making Essential Medicines Affordable to the Poor’, 20 
Wisconsin International Law Journal (2002), p. 581. 
66 P. Cullet, ‘Patents and Medicines: the Relationship Between TRIPS and the Human Right 
to Health’, 79 International Affairs (2003), p. 142 [hereinafter Cullet]. 
67 Yamin, supra note 31, p. 336. 
68 D. P. Fidler, International Law and Infectious Diseases (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999) p. 197. 
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analytical framework is also well-suited for deducing the elements of access 
to medicines. One part of the framework, especially relevant to policy 
analysis, declares that all components of the right to health should be 
available, accessible, culturally acceptable and of good quality.69 Applying 
this to access to medicines, means that States must do all they reasonably 
can to make medicines available. At the same time, medicines should not be 
available only in the urban centres, but not in the rural areas; only to some 
ethnic groups, but not to others; only to the rich, but not to those living in 
poverty; and so on. Such a situation is not acceptable as it would mean that 
medicines are not accessible. In addition, access should be combined with 
awareness of cultural traditions within certain groups and assure good 
quality medicines, for instance by the establishment of a regulatory system 
to check medicine safety and quality.70
 A second, or complementary, part of the analytical framework is the 
well-established concept that States Parties to a human rights instrument 
have duties to respect, protect and fulfil the enumerated rights. This part of 
the framework may be more directly suited for legal analysis. The duty to 
respect obliges a State to refrain from interfering, directly or indirectly, with 
access to medicines. For instance, a State should not market unsafe 
medicines and it should have a medicines policy that does not discriminate 
against any certain disadvantaged group. The duty to protect requires States 
to ensure that third parties do not obstruct the access. For instance, it should 
make sure that a privatised health sector enhances access to medicines for 
all, including those living in poverty. The duty to fulfil obliges a State to 
adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other 
measures of which access to medicines would benefit. This includes 
providing essential medicines to those living in poverty if they would 
otherwise be unable to access them.71
 This policy and legal analysis of access to medicines should be 
combined with a general distinction between medicines. Namely, the 
                                                 
69 General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR, supra note 11, para. 12. 
70 Ibid.; Special Rapporteur 2006, supra note 64, paras. 59-60. 
71 Special Rapporteur 2004, supra note 47, paras. 39-40; Special Rapporteur 2006, supra 
note 64, paras. 47-51. 
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distinction between essential medicines and non-essential medicines. As 
explained above, the right to health, and thus access to medicines, is subject 
to progressive realization.72 However, access to certain types of medicines 
has been declared by the CESCR to be a part of the core content of the right 
to health.73 These medicines are usually referred to as essential medicines. 
General Comment No. 14 indicates that States are supposed to be guided by 
the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines to prepare a national essential 
medicines list.74 If a State fails to prepare its own national essential 
medicines list, the WHO list will apply, subject to contextual revisions.75 
The WHO list includes a long list of essential medicines that needs to be 
made available, e.g. several antiretrovirals (ARVs) for the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS.76 Apparently, exactly which medicines are regarded as essential 
remains a national responsibility, but the WHO list is of great importance, 
both as guidance and for filling potential gaps. Medicines neither on 
national lists nor on the WHO list, usually given the rather unfortunate term 
non-essential medicines, can of course be of significant importance to public 
health. The lists are merely supposed to clarify the minimum need of each 
State. However, it does mean that these latter medicines are not linked to an 
immediate obligation of the State. Therefore, States have an immediate 
obligation to make essential medicines available and accessible throughout 
its jurisdiction. For non-essential medicines, this obligation should be 
realized progressively.77
 It may be difficult to set a certain number of percent of the population 
that should have access to essential medicines for a State to be in 
compliance with its obligation of access to medicines. One of the main 
reasons for this is the difficulty in collecting accurate data to evaluate 
progress. The problem usually arises because of a lack of vital registration 
systems. Unfortunately, this is especially prevalent in many of the States 
                                                 
72 See supra chapter 2.1.2. 
73 General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR, supra note 11, paras. 43-44. 
74 Ibid., paras. 12, 43. 
75 Special Rapporteur 2006, supra note 64, para. 57. 
76 WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, 15th List, March 2007, 
<http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/EML15.pdf>, visited on 3 December 2007. 
77 Special Rapporteur 2006, supra note 64, para. 58. 
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most in need of essential medicines. A more useful approach instead of 
focusing on obligations of result could be to focus on obligations of 
conduct. Inspired by the approach in General Comment No. 14, Audrey R. 
Chapman is a strong advocate of this approach.78 Whatever approach 
applied, the most important thing to note is that, there seems to be a general 
idea that States need to direct their policies towards trying to provide for 
access to medicines. 
 To further cement the idea that access to medicines, especially access to 
essential medicines, is a fundamental part of the right to health, it should be 
noted that several successful court cases indicates its justiciable character. A 
recent study identified and analysed 71 court cases from 12 States in which 
access to medicines was claimed with reference to the right to health. In 59 
cases, access to essential medicines as part of the fulfilment of the right to 
health could be enforced through the courts. It is interesting to note that 
skilful litigation can help ensure that States fulfil their obligation of access 
to medicines. However, it should also be noted that the authors firmly 
emphasise the importance of redressing to litigation only as a last resort. In 
their opinion, policymakers should ensure that human rights standards guide 
their health policies and programmes from the outset.79
 In conclusion, human rights appear to be a justified and well-
established part of international law. Within this framework, the right to 
health has developed into a widely accepted right. Even though it may not 
always be entirely clear what the right encompasses, there is clear evidence 
both among UN institutions and mechanisms and in the scholarly world that 
access to medicines is a fundamental part of the right to health. As such, it is 
an element of the right to health that States should do their utmost to realize. 
When it comes to essential medicines, it is an immediate obligation that 
should be pursued at all times despite of potential obstacles standing in the 
way of its realization. Patents, especially pharmaceutical patents, are often 
put forward as a possible obstacle to the realization of access to medicines. 
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Therefore, we will proceed by considering their place in international law in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
2.2 Patents 
2.2.1 Historical Background 
Intellectual property is the generic term used for various forms of subjective 
rights that various legal orders grant to the creators of immaterial assets of 
intellectual origin. Those immaterial assets may be of two kinds, either 
literary and artistic creations or distinctive signs and inventions. The 
afforded form of protection varies depending on what kind the immaterial 
asset belongs to. Therefore, legal literature has divided intellectual property 
into two subfields, namely; (1) copyright, which protects literary and artistic 
work; and (2) industrial property, which protects industrial creations.80 It is 
the latter form of protection that will be presented in this chapter, more 
precisely a specific part of it, namely, patents. In short, a patent is a legal 
title given to an inventor so she may exclude others from using the 
invention. It works as a deal between the inventor and the public authorities. 
Public authorities offer protection provided that the inventor discloses the 
information linked to the invention. 
 Ideas of intellectual property protection, and subsequently patent 
protection, have a long history. Some commentators date the origins of 
intellectual property protection as far back as the fourth century B.C. to 
Aristotle.81 However, more modern ideas of patent protection at an 
international level can be divided into three periods. The first period, known 
as the territorial period, included instruments such as the 1474 Venetian 
Decree, usually considered the first true patent law, and the 1623 English 
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Statute of Monopolies. In the following centuries, the principle of patents in 
the English Statute of Monopolies spread to several States, including the 
United States 1790 Patent Act and the French Law of 1791, recognising 
inventors’ rights. A fundamental aspect of this period was the principle of 
territoriality. In short, this meant that protection did not go beyond the 
borders of a State offering protection. Thus, international protection was 
basically non-existent. The second period, identified as the international 
period, is signified by a growing interest in international cooperation in 
patent protection among States. This eventually resulted in the creation of 
the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property82 (Paris 
Convention). The 20th century saw an explosion in international intellectual 
property regimes with several multilateral instruments concluded. 
Additionally, the Paris Convention underwent several revisions and was 
accompanied by the creation of an international organization in the field of 
intellectual property. After the merging of two separate Bureaus, the United 
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) 
was created in 1893. BIRPI was then superseded by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), established in 1967 and a Specialized 
Agency of the UN since 1974. 
 The third period, the global period, originates in the linkage that States 
such as the United States made between trade and intellectual property in 
the 1980s.83 At the multilateral level, this culminated in the form of the 
1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights84 
(TRIPS Agreement). States from the developing world were generally very 
reluctant to move patent protection into the trading regime, but in the end 
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more than 100 States signed the Final Act.85 Binding on all Members of the 
WTO, the TRIPS Agreement is at present binding on 151 States.86 The 
TRIPS Agreement has been followed by a couple of declarations and 
decisions concerned with certain flexibilities related to the Agreement. 
These will be returned to later, when discussing patents, and the flexibilities 
offered by compulsory licences, in more detail. 
 The development of patents has been combined with several views of 
justifications advocated for its existence. A commonly presented view is 
that the patent system was developed with a main objective of creating an 
incentive for inventors to disclose their inventions to the public instead of 
keeping it secret. The basic idea is that inventors should be rewarded for 
their effort and risk of capital by the grant of a limited, though strong, 
monopoly. As a result, society will benefit as the system stimulates 
investment and employment and because detailed information of the 
invention is put into the realm of public knowledge.87 Such an argument 
clearly bears a practical and utilitarian flavour to it. In fact, an influential 
utilitarian like English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) argued 
along these lines when advocating that exclusive use of the invention should 
be asserted by law for the inventor in exchange for all the effort and money 
put into the invention. Thereafter, the invention itself could be used for the 
general increase of knowledge and wealth.88 Other views include those 
justifying patents as following from natural rights, consisting of a right to 
property of their mental labour, and justice arguments, claiming that justice 
demands an inventor’s contribution to be recognised by a reward.89 
 Nowadays, patent protection is usually justified as a necessary 
incentive for the private sector in areas in which they are granted. 
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Representatives of the pharmaceutical industry frequently point out that 
their industry spends enormous amounts on research and development. This 
combined with the fact that an existing medicine is relatively cheap and easy 
to copy, translates, in their opinion, into patents being indispensable for the 
development of new medicines and therefore justified. In fact, it has even 
been argued that industries such as the pharmaceutical industry “would 
become stagnant without patent protection through the lack of 
investment”.90 Not everyone agrees that patents are the only way of 
providing an incentive for innovation and the corresponding research and 
development.91 Keith E. Maskus, on the other hand, takes another view. 
While considering several models, he arrives at the conclusion that patents 
may have its imperfections, but that it is still probably the most effective 
way of promoting innovation.92
 Whatever view applied to justify patents, its existence in present 
international law is a matter of fact. The majority of States in the world are 
bound by the TRIPS Agreement. The general idea put forward appears to be 
that patents promote innovation. Some authors adhere to this view and some 
question it. Without necessarily saying something on its functionality, it is 
sufficient to settle for patents as a tool intended to promote innovation and 
development. We will now proceed by taking a deeper look at the 
development of patents in international law. 
2.2.2 Patents in International Law 
The 1883 Paris Convention was the first genuine step in trying to harmonise 
patent legislation at the international level. It contains provisions on patents, 
such as the right to priority93, territoriality94 and compulsory licences.95 
However, the Paris Convention does not impose obligations on a Member 
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State to protect the right of foreigners if the State does not afford protection 
to its own nationals. Consequently, the requirements of the Paris 
Convention could easily be sidestepped by withholding patent protection for 
everyone. International harmonisation and protection of patents was 
therefore difficult to achieve under the Paris Convention.96 Despite the 
conclusion of WIPO treaties, such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty97 that 
simplified the filing for patents in more than one Member State, States 
maintained independent patent regimes. These various regimes used a wide 
variety of approaches, ranging from restrictive patents of relatively long 
duration to no patent protection at all for certain products, such as 
pharmaceuticals.98
 During the Uruguay Round of discussions (1986-1994) undertaken 
within the GATT-system99, pressure was mounting to incorporate 
intellectual property, including patent protection, into the world trade 
regime. The primary advocates of this idea were States having a lot to gain 
from enforcement of patent law on the international level. The United States 
probably constituted the main driving force, voicing concerns over the 
unsatisfactory system of independent regimes and promoting greater 
harmonisation.100 Some commentators have pointed out the influence of 
multinational companies in forming the position of the United States during 
the discussion over a new trade regime. In fact, lobbyists from a number of 
companies drafted several of the documents which later formed the position 
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of the United States during negotiations.101 The advocates for including 
patent protection succeeded and the Final Act, signed in 1994, worked as a 
cover note, with several other instruments attached to it. Those included the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement. With the 
TRIPS Agreement in place, intellectual property, including patents, 
cemented its place in the multilateral trading system and in the WTO it had 
found the necessary institution for enforcement. 
 The TRIPS Agreement incorporates parts of the Paris Convention in 
Article 2 but nevertheless goes on to include a number of provisions dealing 
specifically with patents. Article 27(1) provides that Members shall make 
patents available for all inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, clearly including patents in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Patents are subject to normal tests of novelty, inventiveness and 
industrial applicability.102 A perceptive reader will note that the description 
in Article 27 is consistent with the definition of patentable subject matter in 
United States patent laws.103 Some may interpret this as an indication of the 
influence that the United States exercised on the negotiations and the 
conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement. Additionally, the same Article allows 
States to exclude certain inventions from patentability. The condition for 
excluding inventions is that it is necessary for the protection of ordre public 
or morality, including protection of human health or serious environmental 
damage. 
 Article 28 deals with the exclusive rights conferred to the patent holder. 
For product patents this includes making, using, offering for sale, selling, 
and importing for these purposes. Process patents give rights not only over 
the use of the process but also for products resulting from it. Furthermore, 
patent holders have the right to assign, transfer by succession and conclude 
licensing contracts related to the patent. The duration of protection was a 
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complicated subject during the negotiations leading up to the TRIPS 
Agreement. Prior to the TRIPS Agreement States applied a variety of 
standards, both as to the number of years to offer protection and to the 
starting date of the calculation. Article 33 applies a single standard, 
stipulating a minimum of 20 years of protection from the filing date. During 
negotiations, some States pushed for an extended protection for certain 
products, notably pharmaceuticals. However, no such provision made into 
the final version of the text.104
 Member States are enabled to limit the exclusive rights conferred in 
case some qualifications are met. Article 30 provides that some limited 
exceptions can be applied provided that they do not unreasonably conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the patent-owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties. The text in Article 30 is rather vague, making it 
difficult to deduce exactly what these ‘limited exceptions’ can be. However, 
in the Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products-case105, the 
WTO Panel had to interpret the scope of exceptions in Article 30. Offering 
some guidance on the scope of exceptions, the Panel established that the 
term ‘limited exception’ indicated that an exception had to be narrow in 
scope, i.e. it should “make only a small diminution of the right in 
question”.106 Furthermore, an Article 30-exception was not deemed 
‘limited’ simply because restricted to a certain area of technology, but had 
to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.107 Apparently, unlike the exceptions 
in Article 27, a State cannot under Article 30 reject the patentability of a 
particular invention but only regulate its use. 
 It should be noted that during the negotiations of the TRIPS 
Agreement, it was evident that potential Member States were not merely 
concerned with protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights, 
including patents, as such. There were also calls for balancing the right of 
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patent holders in relation to societal interests, such as public policy 
objectives of public health. For achieving this aim, Articles 7 and 8 were 
included, applicable to the TRIPS Agreement as a whole. Thus, they 
function as a means of interpretation for other parts of the Agreement, e.g. 
applicable when Members take measures to meet health objectives.108
 Article 7 provides that intellectual property protection should foster 
both technological innovation and transfer of technology to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. A general 
principle is established in Article 8(1) allowing Members to “adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development”. A restriction is included stating that the 
measures must be consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, 
indicating that non-compliance based on Article 8 is not an option. 
 In the Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products-case, 
Canada invoked Articles 7 and 8 in order to justify an exception to the 
patent protection provided by the TRIPS Agreement. Canada suggested that 
an Article 30-exception should be interpreted in the light of Articles 7 and 8, 
allowing for broader exceptions to patent protection because of public 
policy considerations. However, the WTO Panel opted for a more strict 
textual approach and did not uphold the Canadian position.109 In the light of 
this, Daniel Gervais suggests that the principles included in Article 8 are 
primarily a policy statement more than anything else. As such, it would 
explain the rationale for the inclusion of specific provisions on exceptions to 
patent protection in Articles 30 and 31.110 Article 31 is concerned with 
compulsory licences of products under patent protection and will be 
returned to in great detail later.111
 Taking account of the potential problems faced by developing countries 
in implementing the TRIPS Agreement, a set of transitional provisions was 
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included in Articles 65 and 66. Developing countries and countries in the 
process of transformation from central planning were given until 1 January 
2000 to implement TRIPS. Article 65(4) provides for a special regime for 
pharmaceutical products. For such products, the deadline may be extended 
by five years if patent protection was unavailable for that particular category 
when the TRIPS Agreement came into force. States considered to belong to 
the least-developed countries were under Article 66 given until 1 January 
2006 to implement. As a result of subsequent development within the WTO, 
the deadline for least-developed countries in protecting pharmaceutical 
patents has been extended to expire 1 January 2016.112
 During the transitional period, States eligible to use such a period had 
to allow inventors to file for patents already from 1 January 1995 according 
to Article 70(8). This provision is usually referred to as the ‘mailbox 
provision’, because the filing of the application is what counts in order to 
assess whether the application meets the criteria for patenting, especially as 
regards to that of novelty. The actual assessment will take place after the 
transitional period has expired. Furthermore, if the Government allows the 
product to be marketed during the transitional period, Article 70(9) provides 
that the patent applicant should be afforded exclusive marketing rights for a 
period of five years.113
 Finally, it is important to note that the framework established by the 
TRIPS Agreement is merely a set of minimum standards. Article 1(1) 
provides that “Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their 
law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement”. In a 
commentary to the TRIPS Agreement, Daniel Gervais explains that this 
indicates that “the Agreement did not achieve all that some countries 
wished”.114 Philippe Cullet simply concludes that the minimum level of 
protection established by the TRIPS Agreement is equal to the consensus 
position that developed countries felt that they could settle on.115 It appears 
to be that the States from the developed world came out on top from the 
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negotiations leading up to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. A global 
system for the protection of patents is now in place. The system is intended 
to harmonise an area of law which had been very diverging from State to 
State prior to its conception. Much of this has been to the benefit of strong 
economical interests in the developed countries. Nevertheless, the TRIPS 
Agreement saw the inclusion of a number of flexibilities allowing for 
consideration from a social perspective. We will now turn to an integral 
flexibility included in the TRIPS Agreement, namely, compulsory licences. 
2.2.3 Compulsory Licences 
The regime of compulsory licences offers an interesting flexibility in a 
sphere that is normally within the exclusive right of the patent holder. In 
short, the system of compulsory licences, under certain circumstances, gives 
Governments the right to authorise a third party, whether a private company 
or a Government agency, to exploit a patent without the patent holder’s 
consent. This chapter examines how this flexibility has developed from the 
Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement and related Declarations and 
Decisions. 
2.2.3.1 The TRIPS Agreement and its Predecessors 
The Paris Convention includes compulsory licences in Article 5(A). In fact, 
Article 5(A)(3) recognises compulsory licensing as the primary means to 
ensure that a patent was actually being worked by declaring that forfeiture 
of the patent would only appear if compulsory licensing proved insufficient. 
For a compulsory licence to be issued, a period of four years without 
working the patent had to take place. Additionally, the licences were to be 
non-exclusive and non-transferable. Interestingly, few other restrictions 
were included, for instance, nothing is said about the need to compensate 
the patent holder economically. Inspired by the Paris Convention, several 
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States included provisions on compulsory licences during the 20th century 
on grounds such as anti-competitive behaviour and public interest.116
 Although the TRIPS Agreement does not mention the term 
‘compulsory licences’ explicitly, it is evident that Article 31 deals with 
exactly such kinds of exceptions along with government use when it is 
talking about ‘other use’. This provision supplements the general exceptions 
provided in Articles 27 and 30 and does not specifically list the reasons that 
may be claimed to justify its application. However, for it to be permissible a 
strict and comprehensive set of conditions must be fulfilled. 
 First, such a licence should be granted taking into consideration “its 
individual merits”, Article 31(a). This means that decisions need to be taken 
for each individual application and that a compulsory licence therefore 
cannot be given to an entire product category, such as pharmaceuticals. 
Article 31(b) provides that the proposed user should first try to get the 
authorisation of the patent holder for the use, i.e. a voluntary licence. 
Without clarifying exactly what it means the Article states that such efforts 
must be made on reasonable terms and for a reasonable period of time. One 
author has noted that the technological development in the State where a 
compulsory licence is contemplated could have an influence on how to 
decide what is reasonable.117 However, in cases of national emergency, 
other extreme emergencies and anti-competitive practices, the condition to 
first seek a voluntary licence does not have to be fulfilled. Again, the TRIPS 
Agreement fails to explain what is meant by national emergencies and who 
is to decide on whether or not a national emergency is at hand. As will be 
shown later, this has been somewhat corrected by subsequent work on the 
topic within WTO. 
 Concerning the duration of a licence, Article 31(g) stipulates that it 
should be liable to be revoked as soon as the purposes for which it was 
granted cease to exist and are unlikely to recur, for instance, the end of a 
national emergency. Additionally, the scope of the licence should be 
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proportional, or in the terms of Article 31(c), “limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized”. Therefore, a compulsory licence could be limited 
to certain claims of a patent. Similarly, proportionality also applies to the 
duration period.118 Furthermore, Articles 31(d) and (e) provides that the 
licence should be both non-exclusive and non-assignable. Among other 
things, this means that more than one compulsory licence can be granted for 
a given patent 
 Carlos Correa has noted that the TRIPS Agreement does not limit the 
purpose for which a compulsory licence can be granted. To put it 
differently, a compulsory licence could work either to import or to 
domestically produce the patented product.119 However, a possible 
roadblock for using compulsory licences for import is Article 31(f) 
stipulating that a licence should “be authorized predominantly for the supply 
of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use”. This means 
that compulsory licences issued to mainly serve the needs of another State, 
e.g. in need of affordable medicines, are not allowed. Consequently, States 
without domestic manufacturing capacity may find it difficult to find 
available exporters catering for their needs. As of 1 January 2005, potential 
suppliers have become even harder to find. This is due to the fact that the 
transitional period offered to developing countries under Article 65(4) has 
expired; meaning patent protection now extends to all areas in those States. 
Unfortunately, this means that potential providers, such as Brazil, China and 
India, all boosting high levels of manufacturing capacity, will not be able to 
export the much needed cheap generic versions of a number of patented 
medicines.120
 Finally, under Article 31(h), the patent holder should always “be paid 
adequate remuneration” for the use. This holds true also for the cases where 
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a voluntary licence does not have to be sought. Similar to a lot of the 
wording in Article 31, no guidance is given on roughly what could 
constitute adequate remuneration. One author understands the condition as 
the need for the licensee to pay what such a licence would normally cost if 
available from the patent holder.121 Not everyone agrees with this view. 
Philippe Cullet looks to the context of Article 31 and states that it “implies 
that this remuneration is necessarily below the cost of a normal licence, 
since there would be no need for compulsion otherwise”.122 Clearly, the 
question of the size of the remuneration will vary depending on what side of 
the non-voluntary contract one belongs to, the patent holder or the licensee. 
However, it is believed that the argument brought forward by Cullet has a 
strong sense of logic speaking to its advantage. In any case, in the event of 
potential clashes over remuneration size, it is for the WTO system to decide. 
A precedent on the topic would certainly be useful. 
 Consequently, the TRIPS Agreement offers the flexibility of 
compulsory licences for a number of circumstances. These situations 
include situations of national emergency or extreme urgency and cases of 
public non-commercial use, also known as government use. Compared to 
the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement goes a lot further when it 
comes to regulating compulsory licences. Unlike the TRIPS Agreement, the 
former only offered compulsory licences for failure to work a patent. The 
condition in Article 31 that has caused most controversy is probably the 
requirement to limit the licence to predominantly supply the domestic 
market. The Paris Convention contained no such provision. The controversy 
created by that condition and the rather vague language contained in Article 
31 in general has resulted in the adoption of a couple of subsequent 
documents and decisions dealing with compulsory licences. 
2.2.3.2 The Doha Declaration 
The compulsory licensing framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 
offered the possibility for developing countries to control some of the 
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impacts of the introduction of patents and for the extended patentability 
provided by Article 27. Nevertheless, Article 31 and compulsory licensing 
in relation to public health issues has been at the centre of debate following 
the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 Concerns, predominantly from developing countries, over the impact of 
the TRIPS Agreement on access to medicines evolved over a period of years 
following the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. These concerns were 
expressed in several fora, such as NGOs and the European Commission. 
However, it was not until the request of Zimbabwe, on behalf of the Africa 
Group, at a TRIPS Council meeting in April 2001 that the question was 
firmly established on the agenda of the TRIPS Council. The Council 
decided to convene a Special Session for the discussion of access to 
medicines to take place in June the same year.123 The initial discussions at 
the Special Session focused on two main issues, namely, a clarification of 
the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and the relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement and affordable access to medicines.124 As a result of the 
initiative by the African group of States, a separate Declaration was adopted 
on the issue at a WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in 2001 (Doha 
Declaration).125
 It is not difficult to guess why developing countries raised their 
concerns over TRIPS-impact on access to medicines. With an extended 
obligation to provide patents for medicines, it is only natural to be 
concerned about the potential effects on access. Surely, concerned States 
also took into account the apparent reluctance of foreign patent holders to 
actually work a patent held in the developing world. In fact, a study has 
revealed that less than five percent of foreign owned product patents in the 
developing world were actually used to protect production processes in 
those States. Vandana Shiva interprets this as an intention by companies to 
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merely prevent others from using the innovation, and, thus, possibly limiting 
access.126
 Returning to the Doha Declaration, paragraph 4 stipulates that the 
TRIPS Agreement should not prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health. The TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted and 
implemented so that Members’ right to protect public health, in particular to 
promote access of medicines to all, is supported. The paragraph also 
reminds WTO Members of their right to use the flexibility of the provisions 
in the TRIPS Agreement to achieve this aim. Frederick M. Abbott highlights 
the importance of this paragraph. In his opinion, it strongly indicates the 
weight that should be given by the WTO to public health considerations, 
such as promoting access to medicines, when interpreting whether or not a 
State is in compliance with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.127
 Paragraph 5 explains the flexibilities available to States to include “the 
right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which such licences are granted”. This clearly indicates that the 
grounds listed in the TRIPS Agreement for issuing a compulsory licence 
should not be understood as exhaustive. Consequently, States should be able 
to implement additional grounds, such as the failure to work a patent or 
environmental protection.128 Furthermore, each Member has the right to 
determine what constitutes national or other extreme emergency for the 
purposes of compulsory licences. In the paragraph, it is explicitly stipulated 
that a public health crisis, such as HIV/AIDS, can represent such a state. 
Though the clarification on who actually determines when a national 
emergency is at hand is most welcome, Daniel Gervais does not believe that 
it brings anything new. According to him, even without the clarification it 
would be unlikely that a WTO dispute settlement panel would override such 
a decision made in good faith by a Member State.129
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 In paragraph 6, the Declaration takes special notice of WTO Members 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. 
It is recognised that these States face particular difficulties in making 
effective use of compulsory licences under the TRIPS Agreement. Though it 
is not explicitly spelt out in the paragraph, it is evident that potential 
problems caused by Article 31(f), i.e. the restriction to produce 
predominantly for the domestic market, are what the Declaration is 
considering. In order to try and conquer the problem, the TRIPS Council is 
instructed to find an expeditious solution and report back to the General 
Council before the end of 2002. Finally, in paragraph 7, the Declaration 
extends the transitional period for least-developed countries until 1 January 
2016 as regards to providing patent protection for pharmaceutical products. 
The TRIPS Council is instructed to take the necessary action to give effect 
to the extended period. This was achieved by the Council in a Decision of 
27 June 2002.130
 The Doha Declaration is not a formal interpretation under the 
procedural requirements of the WTO Agreement definitively interpreting 
the TRIPS Agreement. Only the Ministerial Conference or the General 
Council have the authority to render such formal interpretations. However, 
one author argues that in case of disputes arising over measures taken by 
Member States on public health grounds, the Doha Declaration should be 
used to interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a manner supportive of such 
measures. The reason for this being that the Doha Declaration can be seen as 
“subsequent practice in application of the treaty” as stated in Article 
31(3)(b) the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.131 Other 
authors, on the other hand, offer some words of caution by pointing out that 
the legal status of the Doha Declaration is still uncertain.132
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 No matter what legal status one ascribes to the Doha Declaration, its 
value of principle should not be underestimated. Unlike the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Doha Declaration explicitly talks about compulsory licences 
as an important flexibility. This semantic shift from ‘other use’ in Article 31 
of the TRIPS Agreement to ‘compulsory licences’ in the Doha Declaration 
may work in favour of generating greater public awareness of its existence 
and importance. Another important feature is the mere fact than an entire 
declaration is devoted to the issue of the relationship between patents and 
public health consideration. One author goes as far as saying that the Doha 
Declaration was the first time the WTO “openly acknowledged that the 
public health problems in many countries were in part a result of the 
intellectual property regime under the TRIPS Agreement”.133 Not everyone 
is as enthusiastic about the value of the Doha Declaration. One view offered 
is that it merely restated in more lengthy terms the principles that were 
already included in Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.134
 In conclusion, opinions may vary on the extent to which the Doha 
Declaration has brought any novel ideas into the regime of compulsory 
licences. Nevertheless, it is difficult to question the fact that it has brought 
some welcome clarifications to an area of the TRIPS Agreement that was 
flawed with uncertainty. It may not have opened up new avenues within the 
TRIPS Agreement, but it confirms the legitimacy of pursuing the already 
built-in flexibilities. 
2.2.3.3  The Implementation Decision 
Attempting to resolve the issue presented by paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration, i.e. the difficulties of States with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity to make use of compulsory licences, WTO 
Members began discussions within the TRIPS Council at its first meeting in 
2002. Negotiations continued in both formal and informal meetings 
throughout the year and into the next one.135 During the course of 
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negotiations a number of proposals were brought forward on how to resolve 
the issue. The various proposals can be summarised into four overall 
options: 
 
• Moratorium on dispute settlement cases in relation to Article 31(f) of 
 the TRIPS Agreement; 
• Waiver of Article 31(f) in line with the requirements under the WTO 
 Agreement; 
• Amendment of Article 31(f) to allow exports of products produced 
 under compulsory licence; and 
• Extensive interpretation of the ‘limited exceptions’ clause of Article 30 
 of the TRIPS Agreement.136 
 
Negotiations lingered on beyond the stipulated deadline of the end of 2002 
without States being able to reach a compromise. Each option had its 
advocates. A breakthrough was finally achieved when a small group of 
WTO Members met in mid-2003 to negotiate a solution. The compromise 
solution arrived at by the group was based on the option of a waiver of 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement (option 2 above), until Article 31 is 
amended. This group, consisting of the United States, Kenya, Brazil, South 
Africa and India, succeeded in delivering a Draft proposal, followed by a 
revised Draft, in August 2003. The TRIPS Council approved the revised 
Draft on 28 August 2003 and presented it to the WTO General Council.137 
The General Council adopted the Decision on the Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public 
health on 30 August 2003 (Implementation Decision).138
 Paragraph 2 of the Implementation Decision waives the condition in 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement for exporting Members when 
producing pharmaceuticals for export to States with insufficient or no 
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manufacturing capacity. Consequently, a novelty is introduced in that 
compulsory licences can be authorised for the export of pharmaceuticals 
without the need to worry about predominantly satisfying the domestic 
market of the exporting Member. According to Paragraph 3, the exporting 
Member is required to pay adequate remuneration in line with Article 31(h) 
of the TRIPS Agreement. The importing Member is exempted from this to 
the extent remuneration is paid in the exporting Member.139
 It should be noted that for compulsory licences to be issued under this 
new regime a number of conditions still need to be met. The importing 
Member must still first seek a voluntary licence from the patent holder on 
reasonable terms for a reasonable period of time. If this is not viable, the 
next step for the importing Member is to assess its domestic generic 
industry’s capacity to produce the medicine. If capacity is deemed 
insufficient, it should then notify the WTO with a detailed justification of its 
decision. Furthermore, the importing Member must then notify a potential 
exporting Member, which must in turn first seek a voluntary licence. Failing 
that, the exporting Member needs to seek a compulsory licence on a single-
State basis from its own Government, including the requirement to 
reasonably remunerate the patent holder in the importing Member. 
Additional requirements include certain provisions on packaging, labelling 
and the shape of the medicine and to post information of quantities on the 
WTO website.140
 It may well be that the solution to one of the major concerns raised in 
the Doha Declaration has resulted in a regime that is too complex to be 
practically available. Not least, the requirement of issuing two compulsory 
licences for the same situation, one in the importing and one in the 
exporting Member could turn out to be procedurally cumbersome. At least 
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one author believes that the procedural requirements make the whole 
Implementation Decision impractical to practise.141 Other authors prefer to 
focus on the positive aspects of the Implementation Decision. Curci and 
Vittori points out that a Decision devoted entirely to allowing States with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to make full use of compulsory 
licences is evidence that things are moving in the right direction.142
 At present, a Protocol of Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement143 is 
open for Members to accept, including the regime set out in the 
Implementation Decision. In line with Article X of the WTO Agreement, it 
is required that two thirds of the Members of the WTO accept the 
Amendment for it to enter into force. The Protocol of Amendment was first 
open for acceptance until 1 December 2007. As States appeared reluctant to 
accept the Protocol, the deadline was extended to 31 December 2009. Until 
present, only 13 Members have accepted the Protocol of Amendment.144
 To sum up the legal framework on compulsory licences, three texts, the 
TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration and the Implementation Decision, 
now collectively regulate the use. The inclusion of compulsory licences, and 
other flexibilities, already from the beginning in the TRIPS Agreement 
appears to indicate that there must have been some awareness of the 
potential effects that patents can have on issues related to public health. It 
does not seem far-fetched to believe that the idea of a human right to health, 
including the fundamental part of access to medicines, might have been in 
the minds of those negotiating the Agreement. This awareness is what has 
generated succeeding documents on the topic such as the Doha Declaration 
and the Implementation Decision. It is true that the procedural mechanism 
of applying compulsory licences is burdensome. However, one should not 
only focus on the problematic side. It appears to be more constructive to 
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focus on the fact that some much needed clarification on the rules on 
compulsory licences has now been offered. Furthermore, it now appears to 
be that the WTO considers the flexibility of compulsory licences to be an 
important alternative for overcoming potential problems raised by 
pharmaceutical patents on access to medicines. 
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3 Relationship between 
Pharmaceutical Patents and 
Access to Medicines 
After the rather extensive examination of the separate legal frameworks 
surrounding pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines, this chapter 
will proceed to consider the relationship between the two in more detail. 
Some voices have been raised that the relationship is quite simple in that 
patents themselves actually constitute a human right. Though this idea is by 
no means extensively raised in the literature, it will be examined in the first 
subchapter below. 
 The discussion exercised so far in this thesis has clearly indicated that 
the two areas of international law from time-to-time intertwine. To illustrate 
this, a brief part of this chapter will be devoted to the presentation of the 
worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic. As both areas of international law appear 
to be both justified and well-established, a fundamental feature of this 
chapter will be to consider the character of the relationship. Does it 
necessarily amount to a legal conflict or is it possible to consider it under an 
alternative approach? To explore a possible alternative approach, the 
flexibilities to the present patent system will be investigated. More 
specifically, a particular flexibility will be examined at length, namely, 
compulsory licences. Since the international legal framework related to 
compulsory licences has been covered above, this chapter will focus on 
practice until present and potential roadblocks standing in the way of its use. 
To conclude the chapter, some thoughts on the relationship and the role of 
compulsory licences will be provided. 
3.1 Patents as Human Rights 
As pointed out by Audrey R. Chapman, not much attention has been paid to 
the interpretation of intellectual property, such as patents, as a human 
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right.145 Nevertheless, drafters of human rights instruments have at least 
taken enough consideration of it to include a few provisions that are closely 
linked to the idea of affording intellectual property protection, including 
patents, to inventors. Among these is Article 27(2) of the UDHR that 
proclaims “the right to protection of the moral and material interest resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”. 
A similar provision was included in Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR, which 
unlike UDHR is of a legally binding nature. 
 The inclusion of these provisions in prominent human rights 
instruments has lead to some calls of patents as amounting to a human right. 
The conceptualisation of patents as a human right will clearly have some 
features distinct from its role as an economic interest under intellectual 
property law. The balancing of interests between inventors and the wider 
society included in the patent framework is given a much broader approach 
in the field of human rights. For human rights, the prevailing goal is to 
improve human welfare and not to maximise economic profits. Or in other 
terms, from a human rights perspective, the protection of patents should be 
understood from its role as a social product bearing a social function and not 
principally as an economic relationship.146 Furthermore, and more 
concretely, the human right status ensures that patents must make sure that 
all other internationally recognised human rights are respected and 
promoted. This follows from the generally accepted view that all human 
rights are of equal status and interdependent.147
 However, the drafters of the mentioned human rights instruments did 
not intend to recognise the inventor’s interest as a fundamental human right 
of its own. Article 15 of the ICESCR also deals with obligations on States 
Parties to provide cultural rights, Article 15(1)(a), and the right of everyone 
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, Article 
15(1)(b). The right included for inventors is just a part of a bigger right. It 
bears a subsidiary status and was included with the intention to try and 
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balance the societal interests with those of the private inventor. In fact, the 
inclusion of a right to protect inventors’ interests was highly debated during 
the negotiations leading to the adoption of the ICESCR. Some believed that 
such protection could possibly work as an obstacle to the possibility for 
others to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.148 The CESCR, has 
produced an authoritative interpretation of the rights connected to Article 
15(1)(c) of the ICESCR in its General Comment No. 17. In it, the 
Committee establishes that the right of inventors to protection of interests is 
in fact a human right.149 However, and this is crucial, this does not mean 
that patents provided under the present international intellectual property 
framework should be mistaken for the human right recognised in Article 
15(1)(c).150
 Consequently, a more appropriate way of approaching the issue could 
be to consider the right to protection of inventors’ interests included in the 
human rights instruments as something separate from patents provided 
under the international patent framework established by the TRIPS 
Agreement. What we are dealing with are two different sets of protecting 
inventors’ moral and material interest. The Committee further explained that 
the protection required under Article 15(1)(c) need not necessarily reflect 
the level of protection provided by the present international patent 
framework. In fact, States are free to enter into international instruments 
with a higher level of protection as long as they do not unjustifiably limit 
the full enjoyment by others of any of the human rights under the 
ICESCR.151 Clearly, whether exercised as a right under Article 15(1)(c) of 
the ICESCR or under the international patent system, provisions on patents 
should always consider its potential implications on human rights. 
Protection of patents cannot completely disregard human rights provisions 
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but needs to find a balance for compliance with the international human 
rights framework. 
3.2 HIV/AIDS 
An illustrative and highly tragic example of an area where pharmaceutical 
patents and access to medicines, and the corresponding areas of 
international law, intertwine is the ongoing HIV/AIDS epidemic. Since 
1981, 65 million people have been infected with HIV and 25 million have 
died of AIDS-related illnesses. In 2006, 4.3 million new infections were 
recorded, as were 2.9 million AIDS-related deaths – more than in any 
previous year. Today, 39.5 million people are living with HIV.152
 HIV is a type of virus called a retrovirus, and the medicines developed 
to disrupt the action of HIV are called antiretrovirals or ARVs. The AIDS 
virus mutates rapidly and often develops resistance to various medicines. To 
minimise the risk, a person with AIDS is usually treated with a cocktail of 
ARVs. Today, there are various forms of ARVs available on the market to 
combat HIV/AIDS. ARVs have proved effective at treating people with 
AIDS. However, they are not a cure. If treatment is suspended the virus 
becomes active again, so a person on ARVs must take them for life.153 
 The life-saving medicines in the form of ARVs are generally developed 
by major pharmaceutical companies carrying a patent for the product. This 
holds especially true for newer and more effective versions. This does not 
necessarily mean that a patent is applied for in all possible cases in all States 
of a developing region. In fact, a recent study in 53 African States 
concluded that patents on ARVs had only been applied for in 172 of 795 
possible cases. This had allowed importation of the generic versions in the 
remaining 623 cases.154 However, it has been pointed out that South Africa, 
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the region’s richest State and with the highest number of people living with 
HIV, had most patents in force. This appears to indicate that patents are 
pursued and applied for where there is a potential market. 
 Furthermore, patents on a particular medicine in other States often 
blocked use of the ‘cocktail therapy’ that is key to treatment. Consequently, 
even without applying patents to its fullest extent, access to the necessary 
combination of ARVs could easily be affected.155 As will be shown by the 
discussion on the practice of compulsory licences later156, this can lead to 
that patented ARVs become too expensive for some States to provide them 
in sufficient amounts. These States are exclusively found in the developing 
world. Not surprisingly, developing countries also have the highest number 
of people living with HIV. In fact, 95 percent of the people infected with 
HIV live in developing countries.157
 To add to the economic burden of these States, it has been noted that 
the widespread occurrence of HIV/AIDS significantly reduces the 
productivity of affected populations. To give but one example, economic 
studies have suggested that the South African gross domestic product (GDP) 
will be 17 percent lower in 2010 than it would be without the disease. To 
put it in other terms, US$ 22 billion in output is removed from the economy 
leaving even less money to spend on life-saving medicines.158
 The high cost of ARVs has made them a natural target for the generic 
pharmaceutical industry. Research and development of a new ARV is 
usually quite a costly endeavour. However, to merely copy the product and 
make a generic version of it is not very difficult and therefore clearly not as 
expensive as the process of developing the original. As a result of generic 
ARVs, a number of developing countries have managed to provide life-
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saving medicines to a greater number of people. To put it differently, 
developing countries have been able to fulfil their obligation to provide 
access to essential medicines to a greater degree. The adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the continued harmonisation of patented legislation, i.e. 
transitional periods coming to end, could potentially hamper this 
development.159 In a recent report, The Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) mentions the potential problems of pharmaceutical patents and 
the continued harmonisation. In their opinion, there is an uncertainty over 
future sources of generic medicines which could make it difficult to 
generate access to ARVs on a sufficient level.160
 Some positive developments on the worldwide struggle against 
HIV/AIDS should be noted. Political commitment and leadership appears to 
be evolving, at least within the UN system. In 2001, States signed a 
Declaration on Commitment on HIV/AIDS, adopted as a resolution of the 
UN General Assembly.161 States agreed to look upon HIV/AIDS as one of 
the major challenges to human life and dignity and called for a global 
commitment to coordinate its struggles. Five years later, a follow-up 
Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS was adopted in which States are 
requested to intensify their efforts against what is seen as an unprecedented 
human catastrophe.162 Combined with this political commitment, funding 
levels to tackle HIV/AIDS have increased from some US$ 300 million in 
1996 to US$ 8.9 billion in 2006. However, the funding available today may 
be just one-third of what will be required to respond to the growing 
epidemic in a few years. The epidemic is growing at a rate which makes it 
extremely important that States take their apparent political commitment 
seriously and provide the necessary funds to start reversing the epidemic. 
UNAIDS estimates that US$ 18.1 billion is needed in 2007 and US$ 22.1 
billion in 2008.163
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3.3 Conflict or Flexibility? 
As is evident from the discussion presented so far, the relationship between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines is by no means 
straightforward. Situations exist where the two areas intertwine. In such 
situations, different institutions may call for distinct solutions on how to 
handle the situation at hand. In the following section, an examination will be 
presented on whether such situations translate the relationship between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines into a legal conflict or if 
alternative approaches are possible. Flexibilities to patent protection, 
particularly in the form of compulsory licences, will form an integral part of 
the examination. 
3.3.1 Generally 
From the discussion concluded so far, it seems fair to state that both patents 
and access to medicines are well-established parts of international law. 
Belonging to bigger frameworks of intellectual property and human rights 
respectively, the two distinct areas of international law are connected to 
different justifications and different international institutions. Patents are 
commonly justified as a necessary incentive for invention under the 
auspices of the WTO, where trade and economic perspectives form the focal 
point. Human rights, on the other hand, find its main sponsor in the UN and 
are commonly promoted from a social perspective of human well-being. If 
one takes as a starting point that both areas of international law are justified, 
the next step would be to consider their relationship. As evident from the 
illustrative example of the HIV/AIDS epidemic presented above, there are 
situations where the two areas of international law intertwine. It is not far-
fetched to imagine that different institutions with different perspectives may 
have varying opinions and rules on how intertwining situations should be 
handled. Does this mean that the international law related to patents, on the 
one hand, and access to medicines, on the other, form a legal conflict? Or, is 
there enough flexibility and potential in the present system for them to be 
exercised side-by-side? 
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 A useful method for examining the relationship is to apply a human 
rights perspective to present patent legislation and its flexibilities. Nowhere 
in the TRIPS Agreement are the terms ‘human rights’ or ‘right to health’ 
used, though ‘public health’ is used in Article 8(1) as a ground for taking 
certain measures. Discussions succeeding the adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreement focused on the general notion of public health, to the exclusion 
of individual human rights. The rather vague term of public health allows 
for a number of possible interpretations. One might only speculate if the 
term has been selected to avoid overt recognition of human rights, such as 
the right to health and its cornerstone of access to medicines. At least one 
author believes this to be the case.164 An NGO, the American Institute of 
Medicine, has produced a thoughtful definition of public health: 
 
“Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for 
people to be healthy. This requires that continuing and emerging threats to the health 
of the public be successfully countered. These threats include immediate crises, such 
as the AIDS epidemic; enduring problems, such as injuries and chronic illness; and 
growing challenges, such as the aging of our population and the toxic by-products of 
modern economy, transmitted through air, water, soil, or food. These and many 
other problems raise in common the need to protect the nation’s health through 
effective, organized, and sustained efforts led by the public sector.”165
 
It seems likely that the obligations assumed by States as a result of the 
existing human right to health would fit in well under such a definition. In 
any case, no matter what definition is applied to the notion of public health, 
the TRIPS Agreement has significant impact beyond trade and intellectual 
property. Such impact also stretches into the sphere of human rights in 
general, and access to medicines in particular.166
 Despite the apparent lack within the WTO-system of discussing in 
terms of individual human rights in relation to patents, latter years have seen 
a growing tendency to consider the potential effect of pharmaceutical 
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patents on access to medicines. Not least this is evident from the extensive 
debate taking place over compulsory licences and public health issues, 
which lead to the adoption of the Doha Declaration and the Implementation 
Decision. If nothing else, this development indicates awareness within the 
WTO-system about the value of human rights in general and access to 
medicines in particular. 
 However, this growing tendency is not enough for some human rights 
advocates. As an example, the UN Sub-Commission has adopted a 
resolution focusing on what they believe to be the malfunctioning 
relationship between intellectual property and human rights. In it, the Sub-
Commission expressed its concerns about the impact of intellectual property 
developments, including patents, on human rights. Considering such 
development in the light of the TRIPS Agreement, the resolution declares 
that “since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not adequately 
reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights…there 
are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime 
embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international 
human rights law, on the other”.167 The UN Special Rapporteur on the right 
to health is equally concerned about the impact of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Though welcoming the clarifications of the Doha Declaration and the 
Implementation Decision, he still points out conflicting obligations and that 
patent protection may hinder accessibility of essential medicines.168
 It is not only within the UN-system that the idea of a conflict of norms 
has surfaced. Several contributors in the academic world have raised similar 
concerns. Lissett Ferreira admits that patents may be important for the 
development of new and more effective medicines. Nevertheless, her 
conclusion is that pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines do 
sometimes clash and when this happens patents should not trump the human 
right that is access to medicines.169 Another author adheres to the same view 
of considering the situation as a conflict of norms and firmly believes in the 
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primacy of human rights over trade obligations.170 Joost Pauwelyn has 
produced extensive work on the relationship of WTO rules and other rules 
of international law. With a strong focus on potential conflicts, without 
necessarily talking about the situation of patents and access to medicines in 
specific, he believes that human rights obligations can modify WTO law 
and that the opposite is not possible. In other words, in case of a conflict of 
norms, Pauwelyn believes that the existing order prescribes that human 
rights should prevail.171
 Additionally, promoters of an order where human rights always prevail 
frequently point to the international character of human rights. General 
Comment No. 14 of the CESCR demands Member States to respect the 
enjoyment of health in other Members and to prevent third parties under 
their authority to violate the right to health in other Members.172 In one 
author’s opinion, this requires a State to prevent third parties, from using 
patent rights in a manner that would hinder access to treatment for their 
citizens.173 In other words, in case of a conflict between patents and access 
to medicines, the latter should prevail and its international character should 
work to strengthen this. 
 Another way of approaching the relationship between pharmaceutical 
patents and access to medicines is to try and move away from the conflict 
perspective. Prabhash Ranjan somewhat tries to do this and has produced 
some interesting thoughts. Though admitting that rules on patents and rules 
on access to medicines to some extent impose conflicting obligations, he 
points out that neither of the two are mutually exclusive concepts. In his 
opinion the two areas of international law can work side-by-side without 
one of them always prevailing. For this to happen, it is fundamental that 
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rules are implemented in an honest way.174 It seems fair to believe that such 
honest implementation would include the full implementation of the 
flexibilities offered in the TRIPS Agreement and clarified by succeeding 
documents. The ideas of a non-conflict approach have been further 
developed by Jakob Cornides. He believes that patents, besides protecting 
the interest of inventors, serves the purpose of promoting progress and 
development. If international law on patents corresponds to this purpose, 
there can be no true conflict between patents and policy objectives such as 
public health, including access to medicines. Patents are subordinated to 
such policy objectives and should not be seen as end themselves but a tool 
to realize these higher objectives.175 With this line of reasoning, the 
flexibilities offered in the TRIPS Agreement, such as compulsory licences, 
would appear to have an important role to play. Without them, the quest to 
achieve policy objectives of public health could prove more difficult. 
 Consequently, there appears to be two main schools of thought on how 
to tackle the relationship between patents and access to medicines. The first 
argues that human rights, including access to medicines, and the 
international legal framework on patents are in fundamental conflict. Its 
advocates hold that strong protection of patents is incompatible to the 
obligations under the right to health. The second school promotes the idea 
that patents and human rights have the same goal, which is to define their 
private scope of monopoly power in protecting the rights of inventors and 
insuring that the public have adequate access to the inventions. According to 
this view, patents and the right to health, with its fundamental component of 
access to medicines, are compatible and should coexist. An important part 
of this latter approach is the inclusion of flexibilities in the present 
international patent system. 
 The relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to 
medicines may be a conflict of norms and it may not be. To some extent this 
is a question of how one defines a conflict of norms. In any case, too strong 
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of a focus on the potential conflict of norms will naturally result in the need 
to answer the question of how to solve the conflict. This would include 
examining if there is an order on how to solve such conflicts at all. The 
conflict-focused school of thought presented above would need to deal with 
this question. Furthermore, it would probably have to promote a major 
reconstruction of WTO legislation on patents or at least new ways to 
interpret the documents in question. The relationship does not have to be 
that difficult and a solution does not necessarily have to come from the 
drafting of new rules or reinterpretation to always give one set of rules 
priority. Those types of solutions appear to be extremely difficult to achieve 
and neglect the fact that present legislation with its flexibilities is the result 
of extensive efforts to put it in place. 
 Another more viable approach is to put the flexibilities offered by 
present patent legislation at the forefront. This type of ‘flexibility approach’ 
is also the approach chosen for this thesis. Such an approach includes an 
examination of whether or not the flexibilities provide for a sufficient 
amount of human rights consideration. If they can offer this, it may be more 
useful to promote the flexibilities than to dwell on a possible conflict of 
norms and how such a conflict could be resolved. Flexibilities such as 
compulsory licences were included for a reason and should therefore be 
explored. As it is the idea of this thesis to scrutinise the existing patent 
system from a human rights perspective, i.e. the idea is not to produce any 
form of suggestions on what a possible future system could look like, this 
approach seems valid. Therefore, in the following a brief presentation, or 
repetition, of the existing flexibilities will be given followed by the 
consideration of the practice of one flexibility in more detail, namely, 
compulsory licences. 
3.3.2 Flexibilities 
The TRIPS Agreement and succeeding documents opened up for various 
flexibilities by allowing for exceptions to patent protection under certain 
circumstances and by offering transitional periods for developing countries. 
The flexibilities have been presented in some detail above when discussing 
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the international legal framework.176 Therefore, only a brief overview will 
be given here. The overview is presented well-aware of the fact that 
flexibilities are not the only way for States in need to get a hold of the 
medicines they require. There is of course the contribution offered by aid 
and donor financing in various forms, including development aid from 
States in the developed world, NGOs contributing, wealthy individuals 
offering aid assistance, pharmaceutical companies donating medicines 
etc.177
 Among the flexibilities, there is one that is not explicitly mentioned in 
the TRIPS Agreement but follows from the general character of 
international trade, namely, differential pricing. In short, differential pricing 
occurs when a patent holder sets different prices for its patented medicines 
according to the purchaser’s ability to pay. Differential pricing therefore has 
the potential of benefiting both the consumer, if prices are reduced to an 
affordable level, and the patent holder, who can maintain or even increase 
market share. Critics of this model has pointed out that differential pricing 
offers depend on the manufacturers’ decision and will rather than patient 
need.178 It has also been noted that in some cases where differential pricing 
exists, medicines have turned out to be more expensive in developing 
countries than in the rest of the world.179
 The system of differential pricing is also inherently linked to another 
flexibility offered under the TRIPS Agreement, namely, parallel 
importation. This flexibility is based on the doctrine of exhaustion whereby 
the patent holder loses or ‘exhausts’ the right after the first sale of the 
product. As a result, this flexibility allows for the import of a patented 
product without the authorisation of the patent holder.180 If a worldwide 
market exists for the patented medicine and prices differ from State to State, 
e.g. because of differential pricing, it may be of great interest for a State to 
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import the medicine from another State with lower prices. It has been noted 
that Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement indicates that the question of parallel 
imports is not dealt with by the Agreement because it leaves the question of 
exhaustion outside the Agreement. Therefore, it is for the individual State to 
decide on whether they want to take advantage of existing price differences 
around the world. A problematic feature of this flexibility is that the United 
States have strongly advocated against its permission under the TRIPS 
Agreement.181
 Finally, there is the flexibility offered under various forms of licences. 
The granting of a licence for a patented medicine means that a producer is 
given the right to produce a medicine under patent by another producer. 
Such licences are granted on certain preconditions, including the 
requirement to compensate the patent holder economically. If the patent 
holder agrees to such a licence, a voluntary licence is established between 
the patent holder and a producer or a Government. Some, usually major 
actors in the pharmaceutical industry, argue voluntary licences to be a fair 
and efficient tool for increasing access to medicines and, therefore, a useful 
flexibility.182 However, voluntary licences are dependant on the arbitrary 
will of the patent holder to grant such licences on a regular basis. As such, 
they do not really amount to a genuine flexibility available for States in need 
of medicines to foster greater access. 
 The most efficient aspect of voluntary licences may instead be the role 
it plays in the process of another important flexibility, namely, compulsory 
licences. Patent holders tend to be more cooperative on granting voluntary 
licences under reasonable terms when faced with the threat of a State 
granting a compulsory licence. Compulsory licences have been advocated as 
an important and interesting flexibility throughout this thesis. To get the full 
picture of the concept, we will now turn to look at the practice of 
compulsory licences that has taken place up until now. 
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3.4 The Use (or Non-Use) of Compulsory 
Licences 
Compulsory licences have frequently been targeted as the one flexibility that 
offers a necessary balancing tool between pharmaceutical patents and access 
to medicines. This chapter will examine a number of situations were 
compulsory licences have been on the agenda. The situations chosen for 
consideration are exclusively from developing countries. Though the 
practice of compulsory licences also occurs in developed countries, it is 
believed that developing countries are of greater interest for the purpose of 
this thesis. States in the developing world usually face greater difficulties in 
trying to provide sufficient access to medicines. Furthermore, the Doha 
Declaration and the Implementation Decision specifically target these 
States. 
 Information on the use of compulsory licences in the developing 
countries is quite difficult to come by. Apart from a few high-profile 
situations, Government authorities do not generally make public their 
intentions of making use of the flexibilities to the TRIPS Agreement. 
Reasons for not doing so vary from concerns about losing foreign direct 
investment to wanting to avoid external political pressure.183 Therefore, the 
task of trying to survey compulsory licences in developing countries is a 
somewhat difficult one. Nevertheless, a few examples have been located by 
scholars and NGOs and will be presented in the following. 
 In 1998, 42 pharmaceuticals companies joined forces to bring a case 
before the High Court of South Africa against the Government of South 
Africa.184 In the lawsuit, the constitutionality of parts of the Medicines 
Amendment Act of 1997 was challenged.185 The South African Constitution 
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guarantees South Africans the right to health care,186 and to meet this goal 
the Government had adopted a national policy of promoting access to 
essential medicines.187 The 1997 Medicines Amendment Act was passed to 
further that policy, all occurring in a State with an alarming HIV/AIDS-
problem. Section 15C of the Act granted broad powers to the Minister of 
Health to ensure access to essential medicines, for example via allowing 
parallel importation. Opinions differ on whether the Act also mandated the 
Minister of Health to issue compulsory licences to generate greater access to 
medicines. Some claim this to be the case as a result of the 1997 Act 
overriding previous law.188 Others point out that the 1997 Act is directed 
towards parallel importation and did not change anything on compulsory 
licences as this was already allowed under the 1978 Patents Act.189  
 No matter how one interprets the 1997 Act, it is clear that the actions of 
the pharmaceutical industry were the result of fear over the use of 
flexibilities in relation to patent protection. The pharmaceutical industry 
feared that the amended legislation granted the Government enough 
discretion to implement measures such as compulsory licences.190 Thus, the 
lawsuit became a question of whether the Minister of Health could take 
health based decisions under the Act that would override the exclusive right 
given to patent holders by the South African Patent Act. Parallel to this, the 
United States presented threats of trade sanctions.191
 The lawsuit turned out to be a hot topic in worldwide media and NGOs 
and civil society made sure to make their protests heard. The pharmaceutical 
companies held their ground for quite some time, but finally in 2001, they 
realized that a prolongation of the lawsuit was impossible because of the 
inflicted public relations damage. Therefore, the lawsuit was withdrawn to 
minimise further damage. An out-of-court settlement was reached were the 
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pharmaceutical companies agreed to cooperate with South Africa in trying 
to generate greater access to medicines and South Africa promised to 
respect the TRIPS Agreement and consult with the pharmaceutical industry 
on the proposed amendment.192
 Though no compulsory licence was issued based on the 1997 Act, it 
still generated some positive impacts on access to medicines. As a result of 
the publicity and the fear of compulsory licences, several pharmaceutical 
companies began to offer medicines at discounted prices in South Africa 
and to give donations of medicines to both South Africa and other 
developing countries. In addition, GlaxoSmithKline decide to grant a 
voluntary licence to a South African producer to produce and market 
generic versions of three of its HIV/AIDS medicines.193 This action by the 
pharmaceutical companies can to some extent be explained by fear of 
damaged public relations. However, it also indicates the role flexibilities 
like compulsory licences can play as a bargaining tool. The awareness 
among patent holders that they risk facing a compulsory licence gives 
Governments a better bargaining position when negotiating about the price 
of patented medicines. 
 Finally, it should be noted that the South African case is not necessarily 
directly concerned with the TRIPS Agreement, as South Africa had until 
2005 to implement TRIPS-compliant legislation. Nevertheless, the case is 
usually seen as a symbol of how the protection of private companies’ patent 
rights could affect national Governments’ room to manoeuvre. 
 In addition to South Africa, a number of other Sub-Saharan African 
States have also showed an interest in compulsory licences. In 2002, the 
Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs in Zimbabwe issued a 
notice declaring a period of national emergency because of the rapid 
increase of HIV/AIDS in the State. The Emergency Declaration enabled 
government use of patented medicines, i.e. a form of compulsory licences, 
and importation of generic versions of ARVs.194 The Declaration was made 
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pursuant to Section 34 of the Patents Act in Zimbabwe, empowering the 
Minister to authorise the use of patented inventions for the service of the 
State. Section 35 clarifies that an authorisation by the Minister under 
Section 34 during a period of emergency includes the right to make use of 
the invention for any purpose which the Minister finds necessary or 
expedient.195 The Declaration was also in line with the then newly adopted 
Doha Declaration, emphasising the importance of compulsory licences and 
the right for every individual State to decide what constitutes a national 
emergency.196 Initially, the declared period of emergency was only for six 
months. It has been noted that the rather short term was most likely due to 
the fact that the Ministry of Health feared that the Declaration would be 
challenged by the pharmaceutical industry. When no such challenge 
materialised, the Declaration was extended to a period of five years ending 
in December 2008.197
 In April 2003, Varichem Pharmaceuticals [Pvt] Ltd, a Zimbabwean 
registered company, was granted a licence to make use or exercise any 
invention under patent protection for the purpose of achieving the objectives 
of the Emergency Declaration. Under the terms of the authorisation, 
Varichem agreed to produce ARVs or HIV/AIDS-related medicines and 
supply three-quarters of its produced medicines to State-owned health 
institutions at fixed prices under control of the Minister. It has been reported 
that the company agreed to supply a specific ARV, Combivir, to the 
Government at a significantly reduced price. According to information 
provided by Varichem, the company introduced its first ARV to the 
Zimbabwean market in October 2003, and now has seven generic versions 
of ARVs on the market.198 Reports also reveal that two other companies, 
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Datlabs and Omahn have been authorised to acquire ARVs under the 
Declaration by importing generic ARVs from India.199
 It may be difficult to assess the full impact of compulsory licences for 
Zimbabwe in terms of increased access to medicines just yet. This will 
require further information in terms of prices of medicines and their 
distribution to patients in need of treatment. Nevertheless, first indications 
show that the prices of patented ARVs have not increased or in some cases 
dropped significantly. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the 
Declaration opens up for multiple licences. Hopefully, multiple licensees 
will help to ensure competition in the pricing of generic versions.200
 Following the practice of Zimbabwe, in 2004, both Mozambique and 
Zambia granted compulsory licences to enable domestic production of 
ARVs. The licences issued are very similar, possibly due to the fact that the 
licensee is understood to be the same company in both cases. In 
Mozambique, Pharco Mozambique Lda. was authorised to commence 
production, and in Zambia the domestically-incorporated company Pharco 
Ltd. was granted a licence. The main difference is that while the licence in 
Zambia is limited to a five year period of national emergency to combat 
HIV/AIDS, the one in Mozambique is valid until the emergency created by 
HIV/AIDS comes to an end without setting a specific end date. As there is 
no valid information available on the progress of domestic production by 
Pharco in the respective States, the value of compulsory licences for the 
States is difficult to assess. However, the monitoring of the situation should 
continue so that the effectiveness of compulsory licences in generating 
greater access to medicines can finally be evaluated.201
 Another situation that has received a lot of publicity is Brazil’s national 
HIV/AIDS programme. Since 1997, Brazil has been able to supply ARVs 
for free to all who need them under a declared national policy to combat 
HIV/AIDS by free access to ARVs. To be able to fulfil its national policy 
the Government realized that the price of ARVs had to be reduced and 
decided to apply a twofold strategy. First, domestic manufacturing capacity 
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and production of generic ARVs was to be increased with the help of 
compulsory licences. Secondly, the Government would try to get greater 
discounts on patented ARVs, with the possibility to threaten with 
compulsory licences in case discounts were not big enough.202
 With the ambition both to fulfil its national policy and to comply with 
international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, Brazil enacted the 
1996 Industrial Property Law.203 Before becoming a Party to and 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement, Brazil did not recognise or enforce 
pharmaceutical patents. The 1996 Industrial Property Law provided for 
patent protection of pharmaceuticals, but included the condition that at least 
some of the production had to take place in Brazil. Article 68 provides that 
in case a foreign manufacturer fails to satisfy this domestic working 
requirement, Brazil may subject the patent to compulsory licensing, 
allowing Brazilian manufacturers to produce generic versions. In line with 
the national policy, the Government decided to regulate, or clarify, the 
provision a couple of years later. The Government authorised relevant 
authorities to issue compulsory licences if, after three years, the patent 
holder did not begin to manufacture the medicine domestically. It has been 
noted that the aim of this legislation was quite clear, namely, to increase the 
Government’s bargaining power in negotiations with suppliers of patented 
medicines.204
 This step by Brazil triggered a strong response by the United States. 
After several months of fruitless negotiations, the United States launched a 
WTO dispute settlement proceeding against Brazil in the beginning of 2001. 
The United States challenged the Brazilian legislation on patents for 
violating the TRIPS Agreement.205 It was claimed that Article 68 of the 
1996 Industrial Property Law was incompatible with the principle of non-
discrimination set out in Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
position of the United States was met with a firm response by Brazil, 
holding on to its national policy, including the right to issue compulsory 
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licences under the conditions provided in domestic law. Following a storm 
of criticism from the international community, the United States withdrew 
its complaint to avoid another international relations disaster. In connection 
to the withdrawal, Brazil agreed to hold prior talks with the United States, in 
case Brazil considered granting a compulsory licence on a patent held by a 
company from the United States.206
 The Brazilian HIV/AIDS programme has often been described as a 
success story. Unquestionably, the combination of domestic manufacturing 
capacity and the tool of compulsory licences have proved successful for 
Brazil in generating greater access to medicines. In 2006, it was estimated 
that around 140 000 people had access to free ARVs provided through 
government financing in the form of both domestically produced generics 
and imported patented versions.207 An important part of the programme is 
played by patented ARVs at reduced prices. In recent years, both Merck & 
Co and Roche have had to reduce the price on patented ARVs at the risk of 
facing compulsory licences.208
 The flexibility of compulsory licences has also been explored by a few 
States on the Asian continent. For instance, in 2004, a Decree of the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia was produced to try and control the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic spreading quickly in the State. The Presidential Decree 
provided for the possibility to use compulsory licences in the form of 
government use for a couple of ARVs. The text does not specifically refer to 
domestic production or importation, suggesting that the government use 
authorisation may be for either. Since issuing the Presidential Decree, the 
Indonesian Government has been in discussions with domestic producers to 
undertake domestic production of ARVs.209 Only time will tell if the 
Indonesian approach to the flexibility offered by compulsory licences turns 
out to be successful in providing greater access to medicines. 
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 Similarly to several of the situations presented above, Malaysia 
developed a strong interest in compulsory licences in connection to 
governmental plans to speed up HIV/AIDS treatment. First, the Government 
decided to request price discounts on a number of ARVs to be able to 
increase HIV/AIDS treatment. When such negotiations failed to generate the 
reductions desired, the Government decided to start considering other 
options. Inspired by the Doha Declaration, compulsory licences presented 
itself as an interesting option. Because of overlapping mandates, a number 
of Ministries spent a few years discussing the issue before anything concrete 
could be presented. However, in 2003, the Minister of Domestic Trade and 
Consumer Affairs issued a letter authorising a domestic distributing agent 
for an Indian manufacturer to import generic HIV/AIDS medicines. Further 
discussions followed within and between the Ministries, but in February 
2004 the contract for the importation of generic ARVs was finally issued by 
the Ministry of Health.210
 The Malaysian use of compulsory licences is interesting for several 
reasons. Unlike many of the other situations mentioned, a compulsory 
licence was issued with the main purpose of importing ARVs, rather than 
producing them domestically. Furthermore, it strengthens the idea that 
compulsory licences, and the threat thereof, could also play the role of a 
bargaining tool for States. In fact, in the wake of the 2003 letter proposing 
the authorisation to import generic ARVs, several major pharmaceutical 
companies moved quickly to offer significant discounts to try and 
discourage the authorisation. GlaxoSmithKline dropped prices on a number 
of ARVs by 53-80 percent, whilst Bristol-Meyers reductions varied from 
49-82 percent.211 The Cabinet of Government Ministers appears to have 
been unfazed with the price reductions as they allowed the Ministry of 
Health to proceed and issue the contract in February 2004. By doing so they 
allowed for the ‘best of two worlds’, in that both cheaper patented ARVs 
and imported generic versions would be available on the market. It has been 
noted that with the introduction of generic ARVs, the monthly cost of 
                                                 
210 Musungu and Oh, supra note 194, pp. 24-26. 
211 Oh, supra note 183, p. 28. 
 73
HIV/AIDS for a patient in Malaysia has dropped to one third of its previous 
price.212
 Additionally, NGOs and civil society have been active on pressing for 
the use of compulsory licences in the region. One example of this is 
Thailand were an NGO and two AIDS patients took the initiative to, first, 
have the Thai Government grant a compulsory licence over a specific ARV, 
and, second, request partial revocation of the corresponding patent. Because 
of peculiarities of Thai patent law, the compulsory licence claim looked 
very promising, but ultimately failed. However, the request for invalidation 
for parts of the patent, sponsored by a public campaign, turned out to be 
successful.213 This is yet another indication of the importance NGOs and 
civil society can have on creating awareness about the relationship between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines and the corresponding 
flexibilities. Sometimes the efforts by NGOs and civil society can result in 
Governments considering the flexibilities in more detail or re-examining the 
effects of a specific patents, as in the case of Thailand. 
 It appears to be that the practice of compulsory licences in the first few 
years after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement has been rather limited. 
The condition in the TRIPS Agreement requiring predominant domestic 
sales appears to have directed the practice of compulsory licences to mainly 
focus on generating greater domestic production. The result of this has been 
that the use has practically been restricted to a few developing countries 
with a strong pharmaceutical industry and a large population, such as Brazil. 
States with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity have found it very 
difficult to make use of the compulsory licences regime, even if a specific 
licence is actually granted for domestic production. The necessary 
pharmaceutical infrastructure and technical knowledge is just not in place. 
 The Implementation Decision specifically targets States with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity looking to import under a 
compulsory licence and tries to ease their position. Domestic production via 
compulsory licences is not really affected by it. Both the importing and the 
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exporting State planning to make use of the compulsory licence regime have 
to notify its intention on the website of the TRIPS Council, explaining the 
details of the proposed compulsory licence. Until recently, no such 
notification had been made. However, in July 2007 Rwanda notified its 
intention to import ARVs from the Canadian producer Apotex Inc.214 Three 
months later Canada notified the TRIPS Council that Apotex Inc. had been 
granted a compulsory licence to go ahead with the export of ARVs to 
Rwanda.215
 It is clearly too early to pronounce anything on what the outcome of 
this pilot attempt to make use of the extended flexibility offered by the 
Implementation Decision will result in. Such an evaluation will require 
more data on prices and distribution to patients in need before it can be 
determined if the endeavour has generated greater access to medicines. Only 
then will it be possible to get any hints on whether the waiver of the 
requirement to predominantly supply the domestic market will actually 
assist in creating greater access to medicines. Such an evaluation will of 
course also be limited to this specific situation and succeeding attempts will 
be necessary to get a general picture of the value of the Implementation 
Decision. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that things are starting to 
move. The question of compulsory licences in the light of the 
Implementation Decision has been brought to the front with this pilot case. 
However, it should be remembered that the Implementation Decision also 
brings one problematic feature with it. While the Decision removes one 
burdensome requirement, i.e. the predominant domestic sales, it adds 
another, namely, an intricate procedural process.216 Only time will tell if 
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States looking to make use of the flexibility in the same way as Rwanda and 
Canada will master the process. 
 As evident from the presentation above, the flexibility offered by 
compulsory licences also brings with it an interesting side effect, namely, 
the role it plays as a bargaining tool. Several States have been able to use 
this feature of compulsory licences to get significant reductions on patented 
medicines. The feature appears to be more useful to States with domestic 
manufacturing capacity as the pharmaceutical industry knows that these 
States can follow up threats with actual production. The Implementation 
Decision, targeting States with insufficient or no domestic capacity, does 
not really appear to have changed this. However, this could change if the 
export/import-regime of compulsory licences were to be applied more 
frequently in the future. Willing exporters could result in a growing role for 
compulsory licences as a bargaining tool for States with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity. If pharmaceutical companies know that there is a 
State ready to export under a compulsory licence as soon as the import 
licence is in place the pressure on the companies will increase. In fact, as the 
potential exporter will probably be a State with a well-established 
pharmaceutical industry, i.e. guaranteeing delivery of generics, it may well 
turn out to be more threatening than a potential licence for domestic 
production. 
 Finally, compulsory licences have so far mainly been restricted to 
licences granted for domestic production. To the extent that such licences 
have assisted in providing for greater access to medicines, most notably in 
Brazil, the purpose of compulsory licences has been fulfilled. However, 
examples of compulsory licences and figures indicating greater access to 
medicines in the developing world are few and far between. The waiver of 
the requirement to predominantly supply the domestic market brought by 
the Implementation Decision does not appear to have changed much just 
yet. The intention of the Decision was to offer an opening to States with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity. Until now, very few have taken 
up that option. With a first pilot case in place, it could be that both potential 
exporting and importing States will await the outcome of that endeavour 
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before moving towards the same direction. As the States with insufficient or 
no manufacturing capacity are normally the States most in need of 
medicines, the situation at present is very unfortunate. The fact that 
compulsory licences are mostly granted for domestic production; the 
apparent awaiting attitude of potential exporters; and the procedurally 
burdensome process, all suggest that these States have the biggest hurdles to 
climb in making proper use of compulsory licences. The next step of this 
thesis will be to consider some of the potential hurdles standing in the way 
of the use of compulsory licences. 
3.5 Compulsory Licence Roadblocks 
A number of suggestions have been put forward as to what constitutes the 
roadblocks standing in the way of a fully operational system of compulsory 
licences in developing countries. A few of these suggestions will be briefly 
examined in this chapter. The examination will not be concerned with the 
argument often raised by representatives of the pharmaceutical industry that 
the question of access to medicines is about “poverty, not patents”.217 Such 
an approach tend to focus on poverty as the sole culprit without even 
considering the potential of compulsory licences, and is therefore not a very 
constructive approach. This is not to say that poverty does not influence 
access to medicines or that it does not stand in the way of an extended use 
of compulsory licence. On the contrary, it probably does to a significant 
extent. Nevertheless, it is believed that a broader approach examining 
suggestions on concrete obstacles will suit this thesis better. 
 A first problem appears to be the apparent ‘lack of infrastructure’ in 
some developing countries that could potentially benefit from a fully 
functioning system of compulsory licences. This can be divided into two 
aspects. The first is the lack of ‘health infrastructure’. For some States this 
tends so stretch over the entire health spectra, including health institutions, 
national policy, and legal and technical expertise. Several of these areas can 
be lacking in that they are not effective enough or even non-existing. It 
                                                 
217 See, e.g., Crook, supra note 173, pp. 528-530. 
 77
should be noted that this does not mean that administration of HIV/AIDS 
medicines is impossible for developing countries at present. Some seem to 
argue that generic medicines tend to be hazardous for developing countries 
because it would not be combined with a necessary consumption regime. 
However, studies have shown that ARV therapies in Kenya and Senegal 
have had success rates similar to those in the West.218 Patented medicines 
normally constitute only a minority of the medicines consumed, but almost 
always tend to represent a significant percentage of the healthcare budget in 
developing countries.219 Without a health infrastructure in place where a 
strong health institution formulates national policy to try and procure more 
affordable medicines, generating greater access to medicines will probably 
continue to prove difficult. However, with a health infrastructure in place, 
compulsory licences will probably present themselves as an interesting 
option. 
 Secondly, the lacking health infrastructure frequently corresponds with 
a lacking ‘intellectual property infrastructure’. This usually means that a 
State lacks effective patent offices and the legal and technical expertise 
connected to it. One may think that this could benefit the States in need of 
medicines as an unclear patent situation will allow them to procure 
medicines without having to consider potential patents. However, the lack 
of access to accurate and up-to-date information on the patent status of 
certain medicines usually works the other way around for these States. This 
is because the uncertainty surrounding the situation in several cases delays 
decision-making, or even worse, prevents decisions on the procurement of 
medicines.220
 A second roadblock, which both relates to and further deepens the 
problem of a lacking infrastructure is the fact that the granting of 
compulsory licences is a procedurally burdensome task. This holds 
especially true for the system of double compulsory licences developed by 
the Implementation Decision.221 As the States with a lacking infrastructure 
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are usually the same States as those targeted by the Implementation 
Decision, i.e. those with insufficient or no domestic manufacturing capacity, 
the problem appears to be highly relevant. These States’ experience in 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement is limited. Such a process requires the 
effective cooperation between different Government agencies and 
departments, including trade, health and industry. A similar approach is 
necessary when it comes to try and make use of the flexibility offered by 
compulsory licences. Without the experience in coordinating to develop a 
common policy this could prove a very difficult task.222
 Furthermore, the lack of technical and legal expertise means that the 
necessary procedural steps may be beyond the reach of these States as the 
knowledge on how to execute them is not in place. In fact, in the pending 
pilot case of Rwanda/Canada presented above, the Canadian exporting 
company pointed out the difficulties in overcoming the procedural process. 
In their opinion, the process is “unnecessarily complex and does not 
adequately represent the interests of those who require treatment”.223 One 
should of course remember that the company has an economic interest in 
exporting their medicines. Nevertheless, the burdensome procedure is most 
likely one of the reasons that we have seen so few attempts to make use of 
the extended possibilities offered by the Implementation Decision. If experts 
from developed countries find the process burdensome, it is not unlikely 
that less skilled personnel in developing countries will find it even more 
difficult to master. 
 Another roadblock is added by the fact that even if the procedural 
process of compulsory licences is mastered, it could prove difficult to find a 
generic producer that is willing or able to export. Previous importation to 
developing countries has to a large extent been in the form of off-patented 
generics. However, the sources of supply for such generics are quickly 
drying out. As a result of ending transitional periods, a number of 
developing countries with the capacity to produce off-patent generic 
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medicines for export, such as India, were required to implement TRIPS-
regulations on patents on 1 January 2005. Subsequently, newly developed 
medicines, i.e. post-1 January 2005, are now subjected to patenting in these 
States. Furthermore, applications collected under the ‘mailbox’ provision 
since 1 January 1995 will be processed and possibly granted with patent 
protection.224 Therefore, the low-priced generic versions that other 
developing countries are in need of may not be available for these medicines 
unless States such as India issue compulsory licences. However, the national 
legislation implemented as a result of TRIPS-compliance in these States, 
may not necessarily allow for compulsory licences of these newer patented 
medicines. Seeing as a compulsory licence needs to be issued also in the 
exporting State for a transaction to be possible, TRIPS-compliance in India 
and other States may lead to that the sources of cheap generic medicines dry 
out.225 Seeing as about 80 percent of developing countries can be 
categorised as having insufficient or no domestic manufacturing capacity,226 
this problem crystallises itself as one of fundamental concern to the 
developing world. 
 A fairly practical hindrance to achieving a fully functioning 
compulsory licence system could be the fact that there may not be any 
useful medicines to issue a compulsory licence for. The interest of 
pharmaceutical companies to direct research and development towards 
diseases prevalent mainly in developing countries, so called tropical 
diseases, is at best very sparse. In fact, of the 1223 new chemical entities 
developed between 1975 and 1996, only 11 were for treatment of tropical 
diseases. HIV/AIDS medicines do not really fit into this category since it is 
a problem also in developed countries.227 Continuing focus on more 
‘profitable’ diseases in markets where the return is likely to be higher could 
result in a situation where a State is in dire need of medicines, but where 
this medicine simply does not exist and evidently a compulsory licence is 
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out of the question.228 Additionally, extensive use of compulsory licences 
may not be well-received by pharmaceutical companies. There is a risk that 
the companies decide not to make future technology available in developing 
countries. An overly excessive use may also make it more unlikely that 
future research and development is reoriented towards diseases prevalent in 
these States. Gionathan Curci and Massimo Vittori describe this as the 
“double-edged sword” character of compulsory licences.229
 The problem of finding generic exporters and lack of research and 
development are not the only external barriers. Developing countries 
considering putting compulsory licences to use will also inevitably feel 
threatened by the possibility of trade sanctions from other WTO Members 
with extensive interests in the pharmaceutical industry. In the cases of South 
Africa and Brazil discussed in the previous chapter, the United States 
threatened to impose trade sanctions for making efforts to pursue the 
flexibilities offered under the TRIPS Agreement.230 Smaller States and 
States with weaker economies cannot afford to lose a major trading partner 
like the United States. Similarly, parallel to threats of trade sanctions in 
South Africa, the United States went as far as threatening to withhold 
foreign aid.231 Just like pondering the potential loss of a major trading 
partner, the potential loss of foreign aid may be something that drives 
developing countries to think twice about granting a compulsory licence. It 
has been pointed out that this stance by the United States is somewhat 
hypocritical, since several of its domestic laws allow compulsory licensing. 
Critics usually raise the example of the anthrax scare following the 9/11 
terrorist bombings. At the time, the United States Government considered 
granting a compulsory licence for Cipro, an anthrax antibiotic. In the end, 
the United States did not issue a compulsory licence for the medicine. 
However, it did use the threat of a compulsory licence to negotiate very 
favourable terms from Bayer, the patent holder of Cipro.232
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 An even greater barrier than trade and diplomatic pressure may be 
some developed countries’ pursuit of certain bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements. Many of these free trade agreements include numerous 
provisions affecting patent protection and the possible flexibilities to it. 
Common standards include: broad definitions of patents; an extended patent 
period beyond 20 years; and severe restrictions on flexibilities such as 
compulsory licences.233 Because the objective of these agreements normally 
is to extend patent protection beyond the terms under the TRIPS Agreement, 
they are usually referred to as ‘TRIPS-plus’ agreements. The United States 
has concluded bilateral and regional free trade agreements containing 
TRIPS-plus standards with over 60 States, many of which are developing 
countries with high disease burdens, including HIV/AIDS.234 A strong 
driving force behind the conclusion of such agreements by the United States 
has been the domestic pharmaceutical industry.235
 The concept of TRIPS-plus agreements has been attacked from several 
fronts. Fredrick M. Abbott suggests that agreements affecting intellectual 
property rights be subject “objective prior impact assessment”. In his 
opinion, such evaluations would assist all stakeholders in weighing the 
trade-offs involved in these agreements.236 Abbott appears to indicate that 
some States signing these agreements, especially developing countries, are 
not fully aware of the impact it might have on issues such as access to 
medicines. Abbott’s ideas appear to have received some recognition as Peru 
recently conducted an assessment of the potential impact of a free-trade 
agreement being negotiated with the United States. The outcome was that 
the agreement would limit access to medicines for approximately 700,000 
people, and the Government accordingly recommended implementing a 
fund from benefiting industries to supplement this shortfall.237
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 A contributing factor to the Peruvian assessment was also the advocacy 
of another critic of TRIPS-plus agreements, namely, Paul Hunt, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Health. Besides his involvement in the Peruvian 
experience he has on a number of occasions questioned the legitimacy of 
TRIPS-plus agreements. In a panel discussion at the WTO’s failed 
ministerial meeting in Cancún, Mexico, in 2003, Hunt stated that “[R]ich 
states should not discourage a developing country from using the TRIPS 
flexibilities. On the contrary, they should actively facilitate the use of the 
flexibilities. They should help the [less developed country] deliver the 
essential drug to all at affordable prices”.238 In subsequent work, the Special 
Rapporteur has developed these thoughts to relate directly to TRIPS-plus 
agreements. He believes that “States should not encourage a developing 
country to accept “TRIPS-plus” standards in any bilateral or multilateral 
trade agreement. They should help developing countries establish effective, 
integrated, inclusive health systems that include reliable medicine supply 
systems delivering quality affordable medicines for all”.239
 To sum it up, domestic legislation opening up for the use of 
compulsory licences appear to be in place in a number of developing 
countries. This indicates the importance these States place on compulsory 
licences as a tool in assuring access to medicines and other socio-economic 
purposes in general. However, the potential of a fully functioning system of 
compulsory licences have not yet been realized. Both internal and external 
roadblocks at present appear to stand in the way of such realization. The 
lack of infrastructure translates into uncertainty about the options available 
under the flexibilities to the TRIPS Agreement. Without the necessary 
technical and legal expertise, flexibilities such as compulsory licences fail to 
turn into an important part of national health policy. External barriers such 
as the problem of finding willing and able generic exporter and the pressure 
from influential States, threatening with trade sanctions and demanding 
TRIPS-plus agreements, makes one wonder if a fully functioning system is 
really feasible. 
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3.6 Some Thoughts 
The main theme presented in the discussion above has been that the legal 
frameworks related to pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines from 
time-to-time intertwine. In the following, some thoughts on the future of the 
relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines, in 
particular the role played by compulsory licences, will be presented. The 
idea is to try and pinpoint what aspects of the relationship that needs to be in 
focus for ensuring that the future role of compulsory licences continues to 
take desirable steps forward. 
 It has been argued that States must use TRIPS flexibilities, such as 
compulsory licences, to fulfil their duties under the right to health, in 
particular the part of the right that is access to medicines. It is seen as 
necessary to “curb the abuse of patent monopoly”, or in other words, to try 
and bridge the conflict between pharmaceutical patents and access to 
medicines.240 As has been advocated throughout this thesis, it is easy to 
agree with the idea that compulsory licences could very well have an 
important role to play in the relationship between pharmaceutical patents 
and access to medicines. However, it is more difficult to agree with the idea 
of attacking patents or the TRIPS Agreement in general as something 
abusive. The benefits of constantly focusing on a conflicting relationship, as 
several authors appear to do, are difficult to deduce. It is difficult to see how 
such an approach could benefit the bigger cause of fostering access to 
medicines. 
 It is believed that a different approach to the relationship better serves 
this purpose. A more feasible way forward could be to consider the 
relationship from a ‘flexibility approach’. Instead of a conflict-focus, a focus 
on the flexibilities to the present system has a better chance of contributing 
to the overall aim of fostering greater access to medicines. A ‘conflict-
focused approach’ is usually combined with an idea that large parts of the 
present international legal framework on patents needs to be revised. Such a 
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process is both an extremely time-consuming and highly unlikely event. The 
TRIPS Agreement is the result of extensive negotiations, and, more 
importantly, so are the included flexibilities. An approach focusing on these 
flexibilities would take notice of and respect the extensive work exercised 
by developing countries to get them in place. Furthermore, such an approach 
offers the possibility of taking immediate steps in trying to generate greater 
access to medicines while at the same time keeping the present patent 
system intact. A continuing focus on flexibilities will broaden the 
understanding of the possibilities that the flexibilities have to offer. 
Hopefully, an increased understanding could lead to new and improved 
ways of implementing and, in the end, utilising the flexibilities to the benefit 
of those in need of medicines. 
 The approach of focusing on flexibilities, rather than conflicts, needs to 
be combined with strong support for the potential inherent in the system of 
compulsory licences. Its inclusion in the TRIPS Agreement is a result of 
concern from the developing world about the possible effects of patents on 
the well-being of their inhabitants. The legal framework in place for 
compulsory licences combined with the will that generated its inclusion in 
the TRIPS Agreement and development in subsequent documents truly has 
the potential of turning it into a functioning system. 
 However, not everyone is convinced about the benefits of the system. 
As a representative of the pharmaceutical industry, Harvey E. Bale has 
questioned its potential by using Canada as an example. In his opinion, the 
price differences between generics and patented medicines are not very 
great.241 In agreeing with several other authors, it is difficult to find much 
reason to share this negative view on compulsory licences. To give an 
example on how Canada has or, as in this case, has not benefited from 
compulsory licences does not necessarily give answers to whether or not it 
could work to generate greater access to medicines in developing countries. 
Others take a much more positive stance towards the potential of 
compulsory licences. Naomi A. Bass goes as far as saying that “compulsory 
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licensing will prove instrumental as a device for maintaining affordable 
medicine in poor communities in the future”.242 Similarly, the potential 
compulsory licences have as a bargaining tool should no be forgotten. It has 
already proved to come in handy for a few States negotiating prices for 
patented medicines,243 and has the potential to do so to an even bigger 
extent. However, that does not mean that the promotion of actual use of 
compulsory licences need not be done. In fact, once a State has issued a 
compulsory licence at least once, patent holders tend to be even more 
cooperative when it comes to negotiating prices 
 The full potential of compulsory licences is of course impossible to 
grasp before we have a fully functioning system in place. Nevertheless, it is 
believed that compulsory licences appear to have the potential of playing an 
important role in bridging the relationship between pharmaceutical patents 
and access to medicines. However, to move from something that has 
potential on paper to something that demonstrates its potential in practice is 
not necessarily and easy step. Unfortunately, this has been clearly illustrated 
by the practice of compulsory licences up until now. A more flexibility-
focused approach, where those involved understand the potential of 
compulsory licences, requires a few necessary steps to take place. These 
steps require a large degree of political commitment both within the UN- 
and the WTO-systems and, maybe more importantly, within the Member 
States attached to the Organizations. 
 A first necessary step to take is to try and assure that the importance of 
both patents and the related international instruments, on the one side, and 
access to medicines and the related international instruments, on the other, 
are fully recognised by its Member States. Both the TRIPS Agreement and 
several international human rights instruments, such as the ICESCR, are 
widely ratified and there needs to be a political commitment to respect these 
instruments on a whole. Such political commitment needs to admit the 
importance of the right to health and its cornerstone of access to medicines. 
Similarly, it needs to accept an international and harmonised system for 
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patent protection, including flexibilities such as compulsory licences. It is 
not satisfactory to go just half way and accept that there is a right to health 
but not dedicate enough effort to provide access to medicines. Neither is it 
up to standard to accept an international patent system but provide 
insufficient protection to patent holders, or not fully implement the 
provisions on compulsory licences. 
 Half way-solutions will most likely result in uncertainty about the 
obligations and the options available under the respective parts of 
international law. In combination to separately recognising the full scope of 
patents, on the one side, and access to medicines, on the other, there is also a 
need for companies, States and international organizations involved with 
one side of the international law to respect the other at all times. Mutual 
respect for the respective parts of international law will allow for greater 
clarity in situations where the two intertwine. With greater clarity the 
flexibility offered by compulsory licences will stand a greater chance to 
develop its full potential. 
 For this step to take place, genuine political commitment on a large 
scale on the international level is required. Such political commitment is by 
no means an easy thing to produce. However, some encouraging indications 
can be deduced from efforts that have taken place up until now. While 
recognising the importance of access to medicines, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, in the same resolution made sure to recognise that 
“intellectual property protection is important for the development of new 
medicines”.244 Similarly the growing trend within the WTO concerning 
public health considerations such as access to medicines, symbolised by the 
Doha Declaration and the Implementation Decision, indicates awareness 
about the importance of ‘the other side’. Such encouraging efforts need to 
continue. This would enable a shift away from the dominating conflict-focus 
and open up for more of a flexibility approach to the relationship between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines. 
 A second step to take is to promote and create awareness about the 
flexibilities to the TRIPS Agreement in general and compulsory licences in 
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particular. At present, the rather limited use of compulsory licences is to a 
certain extent due to the fact that States that could potentially benefit from it 
are not fully aware of what its options has to offer. Promoting the use on an 
international level, naturally with the assistance of global organizations such 
as the UN, will help raise awareness. 
 Furthermore, the promotion needs to be combined with a 
recommendation to developing countries to implement the flexibilities to the 
fullest and clearest extent in domestic legislation. The flexibilities offered 
under the TRIPS Agreement and developed by subsequent documents are 
not self-executing and can only be utilised if they are incorporated into a 
State’s domestic legislation. Therefore, enabling legislation is a fundamental 
step in any attempt to use compulsory licences to generate greater access to 
medicines.245 Though most States provide for compulsory licences for 
varying reasons in their domestic legislations, it is important that the 
recommendation is implementation of the flexibilities precisely to the fullest 
extent. Developing countries need to make use of the permitting wording of 
the Doha Declaration and the Implementation Decision. Such wide-ranging 
implementation will provide the full range of options available under the 
flexibilities and hopefully make their application somewhat easier. 
Furthermore, and importantly, it will also strengthen the role of compulsory 
licences as a bargaining tool for the implementing State. 
 In addition, the promotion of compulsory licences should also be 
combined with an attempt to create awareness in developing countries about 
the potential effects of entering into TRIPS-plus agreements. As touched 
upon previously, these States are not always fully aware of the effects these 
agreements can have on public health issues such as access to medicines. It 
seems reasonable to adhere to the view of the Special Rapporteur on health, 
by recommending that developing countries should not be encouraged by 
other States to enter into such agreements,246 or at least that such 
agreements should never include provisions making it even more difficult to 
make use of compulsory licences. 
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 It should be noted that not only international organizations, such as the 
UN, have an important role to make sure that the step is taken to promote 
and create awareness about compulsory licences. The South African case 
presented above indicates the importance of civil society and NGOs when it 
comes to creating awareness about the relationship between pharmaceutical 
patents and access to medicines.247 Their combined voice is equally 
important when it comes to pressing for greater use of the flexibilities that 
the TRIPS Agreement has to offer. Furthermore, an active civil society has 
the potential of strengthening the political commitment of a Government. 
Awareness within the Government that strong voices in the community 
support them to pursue compulsory licences can hopefully assist in making 
them realize that they have the mandate to do so. Finally, the promotion and 
awareness creating efforts concerning TRIPS flexibilities will also mean 
that States honour the spirit of the Doha Declaration and the Implementation 
Decision and the will with which these documents were concluded. 
 Thirdly, there is a need to start taking steps to take the much needed 
international cooperation and assistance seriously. Both the patent 
framework and the human rights framework, including access to medicines, 
are fundamentally international in character. With full respect of the 
sovereignty of every State, their international character should be embraced. 
A vital part of the international character is the obligation to make 
international efforts in the form of cooperation and assistance to help other 
States fulfil their obligations. Both patent related and human rights related 
instruments indisputably establish this obligation. For patents, Article 67 of 
the TRIPS Agreement stipulates that developed country Members should 
provide technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing 
countries. The idea is that the cooperation should assist developing countries 
in the implementation of the TRIPS provisions, including the flexibilities. 
Concerning access to medicines, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides that 
steps must be taken to fully realize the rights in the Covenant, including 
access to medicines as a part of the right to health. Such steps should be 
                                                 
247 See supra chapter 3.4; see also 2006 Report, supra note 160, pp. 201-222, discussing the 
essential role of civil society. 
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taken both “individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical”. 
 The international obligations on States resulting from the ICESCR have 
been clarified by the CESCR in General Comment No. 14. In it, the CESCR 
states that Member States must recognise the essential role of international 
cooperation and show commitment towards it. This commitment includes 
respecting the enjoyment of the right to health in other States, and to prevent 
third parties from violating the right, if able to do so legally or politically. 
Furthermore, the CESCR believes that Member States are obliged to give 
due recognition to the right to health in other international agreements and 
protect it as Members of other international organizations.248 An important 
part of fulfilling these international obligations from both a patent and 
human rights perspective appears to be cooperation and assistance when it 
comes to flexibilities such as compulsory licences. Such cooperation and 
assistance would help assure both that important provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement are implemented properly and that the political commitment 
required from a human rights perspective is in place. 
 Unfortunately, at present, States do not appear to take their 
international obligations seriously. The technical assistance provided by 
institutions such as WIPO to developing countries has historically not really 
focused on flexibilities such as compulsory licences. Instead, the assistance 
appears to have been devoted to making sure that a system of patent 
protection is in place, without necessarily developing its flexibilities.249
 More of the international cooperation and assistance needs to be 
devoted to how developing countries could possibly develop the flexibilities 
of the patent system. Such efforts need to be guided by the idea of providing 
a tool allowing the developing countries to fulfil the human rights obligation 
of access to medicines while at the same time keeping within the boundaries 
of the international patent framework. Furthermore, it is fundamental that 
the cooperation and assistance is neutral in the way it provides advice on 
                                                 
248 General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR, supra note 11, paras. 38-39. 
249 B. K. Baker, Processes and Issues for Improving Access to Medicines: Willingness and 
Ability to Utilise TRIPS Flexibilities in Non-Producing Countries (DFID Health Systems 
Resource Centre, London, 2004) p. 47, 
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/dfidbrookbakertrips.pdf>, visited on 3 December 2007. 
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how the developing countries can use the patent system to their advantage. 
One idea would be to promote assistance from more pro-health sources such 
as the WHO, which is mandated to provide assistance. As with the other 
necessary steps advocated above, the most important factor in achieving a 
step forward when it comes to international cooperation and assistance is the 
required political commitment. States need to start taking their international 
obligations of cooperation and assistance seriously and move from 
something that they have agreed to on paper to make it happen in practice. 
 It is not likely that all States will require the same process for trying to 
fulfil the potential of compulsory licences. For some, the major problem 
might be actual implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities, a lack of 
necessary institutions or a dire need for international cooperation and 
assistance. For others, all of the aspects might appear troublesome. Each and 
every State will have their particular concerns and prerequisites. In any case, 
the three-step approach advocated above could prove to be a good starting 
point for moving forward. If applied, such an approach would create 
awareness about the system of compulsory licences. In other words, it 
would prove to be a good platform for trying to fulfil the potential of 
compulsory licences by crystallising it into a fully functioning system. 
 While advocating steps that need to be taken, one should also take 
notice of the progress that is actually occurring regarding access to 
medicines. As presented above, a first pilot case of the compulsory licence 
system clarified by the Implementation Decision is now pending with 
Rwanda and Canada as the pioneers.250 Furthermore, the last few years has 
seen a growing trend of States without domestic manufacturing capacity 
trying to establish such capacity. The flexibility offered by compulsory 
licences might very well have worked as an incentive for the initiatives in 
these States. As an example, during the last few years a number of States on 
the African continent have taken steps towards establishing domestic 
manufacturing capacity. The base for production varies between voluntary 
licences from patent holders and compulsory licences. Interestingly, a lot of 
the work has been with the collaboration of companies from otherwise 
                                                 
250 See supra chapter 3.4. 
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potential exporting States, such as Brazil and India.251 In a world where 
potential exporters of generic medicines are quickly disappearing because of 
TRIPS compliant patent legislation, it is encouraging to see that some States 
previously able to export are now involved in these initiatives. The efforts to 
establish manufacturing capacity in developing countries should continue to 
be endorsed on a broad level. Hopefully, such efforts will also assist in 
building the infrastructure that these States need. Ideally, the efforts could 
also increase the interest in tropical diseases by major pharmaceutical 
companies to redirect some of their research towards these diseases. 
 An important feature of the Doha Declaration and the Implementation 
Decision is the actual debate it has triggered on the relationship between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines and the role of compulsory 
licences. A key achievement of the debate may be that it has to some extent 
refocused attention to the severity of the problems faced by the developing 
countries. It is hoped that this could work as a stimulus for wider initiatives 
to tackle alarming problems such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Such 
initiatives should of course include awareness, promotion and extended use 
of TRIPS flexibilities such as compulsory licences. However, it is important 
not to stop there but to also consider parallel initiatives, such as building 
domestic manufacturing capacity. 
 In conclusion, the problem of providing sufficient access to medicines 
does not necessarily lie in the present international legal framework on 
patents. The relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to 
medicines does not necessarily amount to a legal conflict. In fact, the TRIPS 
Agreement considered in the light of the Doha Declaration and the 
Implementation Decision provides for a substantial amount of flexibilities, 
opening up for human rights considerations. Compulsory licences form an 
integral part of the flexibilities. The real problem appears to be the 
application, or non-application, of the flexibilities. In practice, States do not 
give the flexibilities enough consideration to allow them to assure that due 
consideration is given to human rights such as access to medicines. Largely 
due to the very limited use up until now, the present system of compulsory 
                                                 
251 Haakonsson and Richey, supra note 177, p. 80. 
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licences can at best be described as dysfunctional. Before a fully functional 
system of compulsory licences is in place, it will be impossible to fully 
evaluate its possible benefits and downfalls. Throughout this thesis it has 
been advocated that a fully functioning system can be exercised with full 
respect of international law related to both patents and access to medicines 
at the same time. Consequently, until the system gets the chance to fulfil its 
potential, the international community of States needs to show a strong 
political commitment to give it the chance to do so. 
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4 Concluding Remarks 
At the outset of this thesis, the purpose of it and a few principal questions of 
interest were given. This chapter tries to conclude the work performed by 
presenting and reflecting upon the conclusions arrived at in what is hoped to 
be a clarifying manner. 
 The first couple of questions were concerned with the features of the 
relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines, 
including their separate areas of international law, and whether the 
relationship constitutes a legal conflict or not. 
 The review of international law has indicated that both pharmaceutical 
patents, as a part of the larger intellectual property framework, and access to 
medicines, as a part of the larger human rights framework, are justified and 
desirable parts of international law. Different justifications and different 
international institutions are linked to the respective areas of international 
law. Patents are usually justified as a necessary incentive for invention and 
receive backing by the WTO, where economic perspectives form the focal 
point. Human rights, on the other hand, has a powerful friend in the UN and 
are commonly promoted from a social perspective of human well-being. 
The examination conducted has showed that the two areas of law from time-
to-time intertwine. Not least, this is evident from the disturbing example of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is precisely such situations that lift the question 
if the relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines 
amounts to a legal conflict or if other approaches are possible. Different 
justifications and institutions with different perspectives mean that the 
proponents of each side may have different opinions and rules on how 
intertwining situations should be handled. 
 An important conclusion on the relationship in this thesis is that the 
problem of providing sufficient access to medicines does not necessarily lie 
in the present international legal framework on patents. Consequently, the 
relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines does 
not necessarily amount to a legal conflict. In fact, the TRIPS Agreement 
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considered in the light of the Doha Declaration and the Implementation 
Decision provides for a substantial amount of flexibilities, opening up for 
human rights considerations. Too much attention in both the scholarly and 
the institutional worlds is focused on the potential legal conflict. The 
conflict-focused approach is usually combined with a solution where one of 
the frameworks, e.g. human rights, always prevails. Such an approach is not 
very helpful for several reasons. 
 First, it is not only highly unlikely, as it would never be generally 
accepted, but it is also undesirable. One could easily imagine the effects if 
the reward for innovation would be too modest – there would simply be less 
innovation. Applying this to the pharmaceutical industry means that the 
speed of developing new medicines to tackle epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS, 
would slow down. Certainly, there may be economic factors blocking such 
development today, but existing cures to HIV/AIDS would probably not 
have been developed without the incentive of patents. Of course, overly 
generous awarding of patents could also cause deteriorating effects on 
access to medicines. Therefore, it appears to be a question of finding the 
right balance, e.g. with the assistance of flexibilities to patent protection. 
Secondly, such an approach fails to acknowledge the efforts of developing 
countries to get the international patent system with a certain amount of 
flexibilities in place. The real problem instead appears to be the application, 
or non-application, of the flexibilities. In practice, States do not give the 
flexibilities enough consideration to allow them to assure that due 
consideration is given to human rights such as access to medicines. 
 People dying because of lacking access to or innovation in 
pharmaceutical products is surely not the goal of the patent system. 
Therefore, it must be of interest to proponents of both pharmaceutical 
patents and access to medicines to strike a balance between the two that 
stays within the boundaries of the present international legal framework. 
The growing trend in the WTO to consider issues of public health in relation 
to patents, evident from the discussions producing the Doha Declaration and 
the Implementation Decision, indicates that steps are taken in the right 
direction. In order to come up with a proper level, a particular flexibility 
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with the potential to function as a balancing tool may be necessary to 
explore to a larger extent. Compulsory licences were included as flexibility 
from the beginning in the TRIPS Agreement and its role has continued to be 
highly debated after its adoption. 
 A third set of questions presented at the outset of this thesis were 
directed towards a more detailed examination of the role compulsory 
licences plays in the relationship between pharmaceutical patents and access 
to medicines. 
 The right to health, including the cornerstone of access to medicines, is 
combined with an obligation to take necessary steps for its full realization. 
That would appear to include the requirement to pursue options that has the 
potential of generating greater access to more affordable medicines. The 
flexibilities offered by compulsory licences have been advocated as such an 
option throughout this thesis. It has been suggested that a fully operational 
system of compulsory licences has great potential to generate affordable 
medicines on a wide scale. Consequently, a fully operational use of 
compulsory licences and the promotion thereof appears to be a useful tool 
for some States in trying to fulfil its human rights obligation of access to 
medicines. Compulsory licences allow States to use a built-in tool of the 
international patent system to try and procure more affordable medicines. 
Being a built-in tool, it has the advantage of conformity with patent 
protection, allowing States to pursue it without having to enter into tricky 
discussions of conflicting norms, i.e. pharmaceutical patents vs. access to 
medicines. It is difficult to see why States in dire need of medicines should 
not pursue this option. Therefore, the promotion and future application of a 
functional system of compulsory licences is desirable. 
 The practice of compulsory licences for pharmaceutical patents up until 
now indicates a difference between developing countries with domestic 
manufacturing capacity and those with insufficient or no domestic 
manufacturing capacity. Although use up until now has been rather limited, 
for States that have manufacturing capacity, compulsory licences have 
proved useful in a couple of ways. First, there have been a few cases where 
compulsory licences have been issued allowing the State to produce generic 
 96
versions of the patented medicines within their own borders. Secondly, the 
most important feature of compulsory licences for these States so far has 
been its role as a bargaining tool when negotiating prices for patented 
medicines. For States with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, the 
situation looks a bit different. These States rely on other States to produce 
the desired generics and must therefore issue a compulsory licence opening 
up for such production. Therefore, these States inescapably become more 
dependent on a global will to make use of compulsory licences. To put it 
differently, these States have to rely on a global will to fulfil the obligation 
of access to medicines on an international level. 
 One could argue that this division between States has left us with an 
‘A-team’ and a ‘B-team’ when it comes to utilising the flexibilities that are 
compulsory licences. States with manufacturing capacity are in a better 
position to achieve the goal of getting access to medicines at a reasonable 
price and therefore form the A-team States. Pharmaceutical companies are 
aware of the flexibilities in present patent law and understand that if they 
develop to stern of an attitude in price negotiations they may very well end 
up facing a compulsory licence. Consequently, compulsory licences have 
and will continue to benefit these States, both as an actually issued licence 
and the threat thereof. 
 The B-team States, those with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity, on the other hand, could just as well bring up the threat of a 
compulsory licence in price negotiations. However, pharmaceutical 
companies will probably not feel as intimidated by this set of States as they 
rely on production outside their own borders. With the transitional period 
having expired for previous big exporters of generics, such as India, the 
sources of exporters are drying out. Furthermore, under the system set up by 
the Implementation Decision, a compulsory licence will not only have to be 
issued in the importing State but also in the exporting State. So far, very few 
States have indicated their intention to export under the extended flexibility 
brought by the Implementation Decision. The Implementation Decision also 
requires a procedurally burdensome process that may be difficult for the 
potential importers to overcome. Additionally, States with insufficient or no 
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manufacturing capacity also tend to be more vulnerable to other roadblocks 
such as the lack of health and intellectual property infrastructure, trade and 
diplomatic pressure, and TRIPS-plus agreements. Therefore, it appears to be 
that the States most in need of medicines, despite the added opportunities 
under the Doha Declaration and the Implementation Decision, are still the 
ones facing most difficulty in making use of the flexibilities offered by 
compulsory licences. 
 A positive aspect of the fairly intense discussions on the relationship 
between pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines over the last few 
years is that the issue is now clearly on the international political agenda. 
Everyone from international organizations, such as the UN and the WTO, to 
scholars and civil society now appear to show an interest. The fact that an 
actual discussion is taking place indicates awareness of problematic features 
in the relationship and, more practically, has resulted in the adoption of 
documents such as the Doha Declaration and the Implementation Decision. 
To some extent, this indicates that the patent framework needs to be, and is, 
concerned with possible social implications of its exercise. The fact that 
there is a living discussion is encouraging and hopefully it will lead to more 
developments on how to make international regulations on pharmaceutical 
patents and access to medicines function well together. It is hoped that the 
role of compulsory licences will continue to form an integral part of such 
development. 
 In conclusion, the examination on the relationship between 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines has proved to be an 
interesting task. The present international patent regime offers flexibilities in 
several forms, notably in the form of compulsory licences which have been 
at the front of this study. The character of compulsory licences is that of a 
tool with the potential to assist States in their efforts to try and satisfy 
human rights obligations, such as access to medicines. Unfortunately, the 
system of compulsory licences has not yet been able to truly fulfil its 
potential. For that to happen, it is vital that all States involved start taking 
their international commitment to patent protection, including flexibilities to 
it, and to the right to health, including access to medicines, seriously. There 
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is a need to create awareness about the options available under compulsory 
licences and promote the idea of getting a fully operational system in place. 
Another necessary step would be to provide for compulsory licences by 
taking the appropriate implementation decisions, both in possible exporting 
and importing States, including full implementation of the flexibilities. 
Furthermore, extended international cooperation and technical assistance is 
fundamental both to get the necessary legal framework in place and to get 
the system fully operational. Only time will tell if States are willing to take 
the next step and thereby declare their commitment on a worldwide level. 
 It should of course be remembered that compulsory licences merely 
constitutes one helpful piece of a much larger health puzzle. Patents are not 
the only potential obstacle for access to medicines in developing countries. 
Millions and millions of people around the world lack access to essential 
medicines, several of those living in States not yet protecting 
pharmaceuticals under patents. Poverty is normally a troublesome and 
fundamental feature in these States. Furthermore, compulsory licences are 
not the only way to tackle possible adverse effects that patents may have on 
access to medicines. Tools such as differential pricing and parallel imports 
also have roles to play. Nevertheless, recognising the importance of 
compulsory licences as a balancing tool and making use of it on a regular 
basis will foster societal progress and the strife for the highest attainable 
standard of health for all. This would be a constructive step towards making 
the marriage between pharmaceutical patents and the access to medicines 
into a pleasant one. 
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